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Abstract
To manY Western observers，it has seemed that c01laborative
research schemes organised bYJapan′s Hinistry of　＝nternational
Trade and　＝ndustry（M＝T＝）have plaYed animportant r01ein the
COuntrY’s rapid development of its computer and semiconductor
COmPOnentindustries．Japan，S1981announcement ofits Fifth
Generation Computer Systems initiative prompted a number of
Western attempts to′　matCh Japan′s competitive performance bY
using’．Japanese－StYle”C011aboration to support researchin the
Various constituent areas of information technologY　（IT）・
Howeverr thereis evidence to suggest that many of these Western
SChemes failed to take full account of a number of special
features associated with theJapanese environment・
The present paper considers whY gOVernmentSintervene to support
＝T and presents a classification of different types of support
POlicies．　This modelis used to assess the changing rOie that
C011aboration has played within the development of Japan’s
COmPuter and related industries．　Comparisons with Western
VerSions of c01laboration are then used to helpidentify factors
that affect the relative success of collaborative research
PrOjects as mechanisms for promotingincreased competitiveness・
A central message that f0110ws from these comparisonsis that the
use of collaboration as a”market modifYing mechanism”r Should
take appropriate account of the complex nature of market
StruCtureS and the waysin which these structures vary between
different national environments・Japan，s c011aborative schemes
ev01ved g・raduaily and their development has been shaped bY many
factors that are specific to Japan．　＝f these factors are
ig‘nOred′　there is a strong possibilitY that attempts to
transplant the collaboration model to different national
environments will suffer from adaption problems and a failure to
functionin the waY that wasintended．
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Section l；　　Zntroduction
The motivation behind the present paperis derived from the
author，s experience with the evaluation of a ma］Or gOVernment－
SPOnSOredinitiative which was designed to promote Britain’s
COmPetitiveness in theinformation techn01ogY（ZT）sectOr bY
SuPPOrting　一．Japanese－Style”t．一pre－COmpetitivef．collaborative
research・This five－year Britishinitiative′known as the HAlvey
Programme”，WaS a direct reSponse toJapan，S1981announcement
Of its government－SPOnSOred c011aborative project to devel0P
．一fifth generationH computer sYStemS・At that timet the apparent
SuCCeSS Of previousinitiatives sponsored bYJapan，s Ministry of
＝nternational Trade andIndustry（MZTI）had given the concept of
”C011aborative research”a high degree of credibiiityin the
West．
During the1980S，C011aborative research experienced a rapid
growth in popularitY amOng Western countries struggling to
maintain a competitive positionin ev01ving　＝T markets・　Yetl
While many of these schemes have madeimportant contributions to
the”nationalinnovation sYStemS一一　〇f the countries concerned′
improvementsin competitive advantage have often failed to match
Western perceptions of the achievements made bY Japanese
initiatives・With this problemin mind，the present discussion
COnSiders the nature of MZTI，s c01laborative　＝Tinitiatives and
the wayin which theY functionedin theJapanese environment・
The argument is based on interviews with members of Japanese
firms，gOVernment Officials，reSearChers that have beeninvolved
WithHZTI，s c011aborative research schemes and published sources．
On the basis of thisinformation，itis proposed that a deeper
understanding ofJapan，s researchinitiatives provides a useful
basis for re－aPPraising attempts toimitate these p01iciesin the
West・The West，s use ofJapanese－Style c011aboration to compete
WithJapan should take careful account of the contextin which
Japanese schemes were developed and use this as the basis for
COnSidering how a similarinitiative mightinteract with the
nationalinnovation sYStemin question．
－3－
With regard to assessing the nature of Japanese－StYle
COllaboration as a　一．policY Challenge．．to the Westr AIveYis of
SPeCial interest in that it embodied keY features that were
Subsequently adopted by a number of other attempts，in both
Europe and the United States，tO uSe COl1aborative research to
PurSue enhanced competitiveness．Itis used as here as a case－
Study of a government－SpOnSOred European response tO Japan’s
Fifth Generation Computer Programme・虻entionis also made of the
rise of collaborative researchin the US since the earlY－1980S・
The development of these US initiatives may be traced from
Private sector collaborative schemes which wereinstrumentalin
SeCuring a relaxation of the Anti－Trust Laws：therebY PaVing the
WaY for an expansion of private sector ventures and thelaunch
Of federally－funded collaborative ventures．
One message that appears to follow from attempts to imitate
Japan’s co11aborative schemesis that collaboration，aS a Hmarket
modifYing mechanism”，Should take account of the complex nature
Of market structures and．　also′　the fact that there are
Significant variationsin the way that these structures operate
in different national environments．　If the West fails to
recognise the significance of contextual factors that have shaped
the evolutionarY development ofJapan′s c011aborative schemest
thereis a strong possibilitY that attempts to transplant this
COllaboration model to different national environments wili
Suffer from adaption problems and a failure to functionin the
Way that wasintended・　The following quotation relating to a
failure bY the West to understand theJapanese corporationr or
．lkaishaH provides a convenient analogY for summarising the
Shortcomings that can be associatedwithmanyWestern perceptions
OfJapanese c011aborative research schemes．
But now thereis a danger of the strengths of the kaisha
being overestimated just as these companies were for s0
10ng underestimated・　SomeJapanese firms do well；Others
do badlY・The strengths and tactics of the kaisha need not
be surprising to those who analYZe their behaviour and who
－4－
deveiop plans for effective competitive response．
（Abegglen and Stork；1985　p17）
A central theme of the present paperis that，in the eariY－1980S，
the strengths ofJapanese coilaborative research schemes seem to
have been overestimatedin the same waY that theYWere PreViousiy
underestimated・　In reality．Japanese schemes have included
failures as we11as successes and their strengths and tactics are
best understood byi00king closely at how theY have functioned
Within the context ofJapaneseindustrial developmentin the ZT
SeCtOr．
The case of AlveY Can be used toi11ustrate a scheme which was
largelY justifiedin terms of enhancing‘UK competitiveness，but
PrOduced achievements were seen in mainlY in terms meeting
techn010giCal research targets and a Hstructural．．broadening of
the UK research base，Which was supported by the formation of
extensive”networks”within theIT communitY（GuY，Georghiou′RaY
et al：1991pii－iii）・　This gave the UK　工T research base
increased coherence and created new channels of communication
between industrY and academia・　Nevertheless′　the evaluators
final report on theinitiative noted that theintended boost to
national competitiveness did not occur on the scale that was
hoped for；
The major disappointment（Of the programme）concerned the
goal of enhancing competitiveness・　　A11　the ma］Or
indicators of the prog‘ramme Show declining competitiveness
in the UK　工T sector during thelifetime of the programme；
market shares declined and ma］Or firms passed wholly or
Partia11yinto foreign OWnerShip．
（GuY，Georghiou，RaY et al：1991p xviii）
The apparent failure of BritishindustrY tO CaPitalise on the
research outputs produced under the AlveY Programme raises
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questions about the extent to whichitis realistic to expect
thatpre－COmPetitive c011aborativeresearchwillpromotenational
COmPetitiveness．prior toJapan，s FifthGeneration announcement，
the competitiveinstincts of Western companies tended to restrict
COllaborative research to a verylimited rang‘e Of circumstances
Where the advantage of sharing the costs and uncertainties of
research outweighed the disadvantage of having to share that
knowledge with other parties・The European syStem Of Zndustriai
Research Associations provides an example of research funded
］Ointlyl by firms and the governmentsr Which has been described
as．．worthY．l but”hardlY mOre eXCiting than the work of thelocal
Post Office”（Woodward；1965　p38）・As the Director of a well－
known British Research Association remarked；
Sir，running a Research Associationisiike a dog，s walking
On its hinder leg‘S．　＝t is not done well but you are
Surprised to findit done at all．
（Woodward：1965　p39）
This image of collaborative research as a rather peripheral
activity makes the West，s apparent conversion to the paradoxical
Principle of Hcollaborating to compete．．all the more remarkable・
Horeover，eVen though there is evidence to suggest that the
extent of increased competitiveness broug‘ht about bY these
SChemesis questionable，Pre－COmPetitive collaborative research
has become more prominentin Europe and the United States・
Structure of the paper
Section　2　considers the significance ofJapan，s announcement of
its FifthGeneration SYStemComputer SYStemS Project andpresents
an overview of the princIPal issues which are addressed in
Subsequent sections・　These cover three main areas：general
PerSPeCtives on ZT support p01icies；　a CaSe胃historY Of
government一〇rChestrated collaboration in the Japanese　＝T
industrYr and；Western responses to the”Japanese Model・・・
－6－
The perspectives on government p01icies to support ZT presented
in Section　3　serve to locate collaborative research within a
broader range of policY OPtions．This subjectis approached bY
COnSidering．whY gOVernmentS Should support ZT and the nature of
different types of ZTinitiatives．　The section closes with a
Classification of schemes．
Section　4　focuses onJapan′s development of policyinitiatives
to supportIT・　工t shows how c011aboration emerged as onlY One
Of four basic tYPeS Of ZT support p01icies・H＝TZ，s schemesin
the computer hardware and semiconductor components sectors are
reviewed to identifY Various steps in the process bY Which
Japanese firms gradually closed the gap with ZBM and other
leading Western producers・Ztis argued′　that while government－
SPOnSOred c011aborationhas provided amechanism foraccelerating
the pace at which Japanese firms could．，captureH and exp10it
best－PraCtice technology′　　this was done in a distinctlY
COmPetitive（as opposed to c00Perative）environment・Japanese
firms preserved their competitive identities and general1Y
managed to avoid sharing knowledge associated with near－market
technologY・In addition to competition between firmst itis
noted that there were conflicts between theindustrial ambitions
held by companies and MZTI，s view ofits p01icY Objectives；nOt
to mention rivalrY between　社＝TI and other ministries．　M＝TI，s
FifthGeneration pro］eCtis then contrastedwith previous schemes
as a　”new direction”　to the established trajectorY Of
COliaborative research ventures．Finally′　Section4．2contrasts
the success of hardware support schemes to the much more
PrOblematic historY that has been associated with c011aborative
research in software．
＝n section　5t the AIveY Prog・rammeis used as an example of a
leading European response to the Fifth Generationllchallengel．・
By contrast with the preceding・Japanese schemesr this was mainlY
focused on research that was some distance from the market and
WaS designed on the assumption that firms would engagein the
Sharing and joint production of knowledge．　＝t featured a ma］Or
－7－
input from the academic sector and served to consolidate and
restructure the nationalIT knowledge base through the creation
Of new cornmunication networks and an expansionin the number of
researchers．
A perspective on the rise of c011aborationin the USis provided
in Section6・This provides a further dimension to the picture
in that pressure forincreased collaboration maY be traced from
the private sector・　A relaxation of the countrY・s Anti－Trust
Legislationr Which had been ama］Or distinguishing feature of the
US”nationalinnovation sYStem．一　followed and there have since
been federally－funded c011aborative schemes to promote
COmPetitiveness．
Fina11Yr Section　7　presents conclusions that follow from the
StudY・　These serve to highlight the complex nature of market
StruCtureS・　While nationalinnovation sYStemS are genera11y
COnCerned with translating knowledge into commercially
exploitable techn010gYr there are significant variationsin the
WaYin which they do this．The use of c011aboration as a Hmarket
modifying mechanismH should take careful account of these
Variations・Japanese－StylecoilaborationemergedintheJapanese
environment and was shaped bY a number of factors that are
SPeCific to that environment．
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2　　　An overview of the zssues
During the‾1970S，developments in computer and communication
techn010gieS COnVerged to create a new arena of competition：
information techn01ogy（IT）．The combination of computing power
With the message－Sending capability of telecommunications
redefined traditional boundaries between the gathering，
PrOCeSSing and distribution ofinformation．　At the same time，
advances in microelectronic techn010gy paved the way for
SpeCtaCular improvements in the performance－tO胃COSt ratio of
COmPutingt thereby fuelling the rapid expansion of＝Tmarkets and
the diffusion of the techn010gY into new areas of economic
activity・　The pervasive nature of　＝T helped to ensure thatit
WaS quick to emerge as an essentialingredientin the economic
development ofindustrial economies．
Japan，s government p01icies to support its computer and
Semiconductorindustries during the1960s and1970s have often
been cited as animportant elementinits abilitY tO eXPloit
OPPOrtunities created bY the H＝T revolutionH・　As the1980s
unf01ded．many countriesl00ked toJapan as a prime example of
the apparent benefits that could be derived from pursuing
appropriate p01icies to support the constituent elements ofIT・
There was a g‘rOWing realisation that a vibrant ZT sector embodies
enormous potential for stimulating sig・nificant growth in
employment，　tOgether with enhanced overall competitiveness
arising from performance improvements in a whoie host of
downstream userindustries・　A number of governments also view
access to state－Of－art ZT as being of crucialimportance to the
maintenance of an effective defence capability・To a greater or
lesser extentr governments have been forced to take note of ZT
and a pr01iferation of p01icies to promote national capabilities
in this sector has f01lowed．
Western awareness of Japan，s r01e as a leading exponent of
effectiveIT policiesincreased dramaticallY during thelate－
1970S・At that timer there were signS thatJapan had started to
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drawlevel with the United States in certain areas of computer
hardware and semiconductor component technologieS・　To manY
Western observers′it seemed that close c00Peration between the
State and privateindustrY had fostered the development of a
highly－effective．．nationalinnovation sYStem‖・Respect for the
apparent achievements of this sYStem WaS a ma］Or factor in
CauSing Japan，S　1981announcement of its Fifth Generation
Computer Pro］eCt tO Send shock waves of concern reverberating
around competitor＝Tindustries．It seemed thatJapan’s national
innovation sYStem WaS about to be trained on a new target：
advanced research．
Whereas previous p01icies had been concerned mainly with
transferring existing techn010gY tO Japanese firms，PrOgreSS
towards”fifth generationH computing was to be research－driven・
The project was directed towards uncharted territorY，beYOnd the
PreVailing forefront of international best practice research・
Fifth generation computers wereintended to understand spoken
instructionst emulate human reasoning andexplainhowconclusions
are reached；therebY PrOViding a practical realisation of
SOPhisticated artificialinte11igence（AI）・　The programme was
regarded widely as a bid byJapan toleadinternational best－
PraCtice techn010gYin this sector．　Although estimates of the
ultimate tractabilitY Of this ground inv0lved considerable
uncertaintY，the West，s fear wasJapan might be able to useits
，．nationalinnovation sYStemH to create an abilityin an area of
A＝　which had suffered a credibilitY Crisisin the West causedt
in partt by the over optimistic claims of enthusiasts for the
discipline．　Zrrespective of theits eventual outcome，the fact
that Japan was prepared to launch such an initiative was
acknowledged widelY aS being a clear signai that the countrY had
reached a position whereit could mount a serious offensive on
the verY frontier ofinternational best－PraCticer advanced　＝T
research・　The Fifth Generation programme was used extensivelY
byJapan’s competitors as a justification for adopting a more
interventionist approach to＝Tp01icY・Fern6has noted that some
20　0ther national prograrrLmeS followedin the wake of the Fifth
－10－
Generation announcement（Fern6：1989　plO）．
AlthoughJapan hadimplemented a range of different p01icies to
SuPPOrt different aspects of ZT，the model that captured the
West，s attention was the sYStem Of Engineering Research
Associations（ERAs），Organised bY the Ministry ofInternational
Trade and Zndustry（Ⅱ＝T＝）．These ERAs，Which wereinitiatedin
the earlY－1960sr inv01ve government support forl．horizontal”
COllaborative groupingS that allow competing firms to pursue a
SPeCified agenda of research on a temporarY basis．　During the
late－1970sr the widelY－aCClaimed success of c011aborative
initiatives，SuCh as the Very Larg‘e ScaleInteg‘ration（VLS＝）
PrOject，helped to reinforce theidea that HZT＝，s ERAs had a
ma］Or r01e to playin helping Japanese firms to become more
COmPetitive・　＝t seemed asif the government had conspired with
industrY tO eXPloit the paradoxical notion of Hc01laborating to
COmPete’．・Japanese firms appeared to have become competitive bY
C011uding‘in government－SPOnSOred initiatives to suspend the
COnCePt Of competition during the development phases of
technolog‘Ylife－CyCles．Arguments to the effect that this sort
Of p01icY WOuld only bring short－term g・ains became hard to
SuStainin the face ofJapan，s record of continuedincreasesin
its share of world markets for semiconductor components and
COmPuter hardware．There was growing supportin the West for the
diagnosis thatJapanesecollaborativeresearch．lworkedH′although
details of the design and implementation of these schemes
received ratherless attention．　While the exact extent of HIT＝，s
COntribution toincreasedindustrial competitivenessis a matter
for debate，it did appear that MZT＝，s Hvision”for the computer
and semiconductor components sectors had coincided with dramatic
improvements in”revealed industrial performance’’・　MZT＝’s
COmPuter－related ERAs had become sYnOnymOuS With success・　The
fact that the Fifth Generation pro］eCt WaS also going to be
C011aborative raised the spectre of extending this momentum of
SuStained progressinto a new area of basic research・
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Suddenly′　it seemed that the West，s view of c011aborative
research had changed．　Znstead of being seen as a rather
Peripheral activitYr COllaborative research became”fashionableH
and emerged as a keYingredientin a number of European and US
VentureS tOPrOmOte COmPetitiveness．However，manYWestern－StYle
attempts toimitate the perceived success ofJapan，s c00Perative
SChemes（”fighting fire with fire”）do not appear・tO have taken
full account of several keY POints relating to the practical
OPeration of”Japanese－StYleH collaboration・　Littleimportance
Seemed to be attached to the fact that the structure and
Objectives of HZTI，s ERAs ev0lved graduallY and were continuallY
redefined as a consequence of a”push－me－Pull－yOu”dialogue
between the government and partiCIPating firms・　There was no
Standard”blueprint”for desig‘ning ERAs・　0ver the YearS，
modifications wereintroduced as part of an evoIving process to
COrreCt PaSt PrOblems and react to changesin techn010giCal and
market environments．　Structural variations haveincluded shifts
in the respective level of government and industry funding；
differences in the duration of pro〕eCtS and shifts in the
mechanisms for knowledge sharing・　At different timesJ the
Japanese models of c011aboration have varied between a clear
division of labour，based on self－COntained．．modular．f work
PrOg‘rammeS，and the］Oint creation of knowledge in a central
research laboratorY Staffed bY reSearChers seconded from
C011aborating firms・This has reflected a shift awaY from”near
market”，　aPPlication一〇riented schemes　（Where cornmercial
SenSitivities necessitated a degree of modular organisation）and
towards the more basic research of the tYPe COnducted under the
Fifth Generation Computer SYStemS PrOject．
Japan，s c011aborative schemes have evolved against the background
Of simultaneous shiftsin the relative abilitY OfJapanese firms
t00Perate effectivelYin the g・lobal arena of competition・ThisT
in turnr has hadimplications for the extent to which M＝T＝　can
act as an Hhonest brokerfT and Hlegitimate．．agent for mediating
between rival firms・Zn this respecttit could be argued that
improvementsin theinternational competitiveness ofJapanese
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fims undermined the Significance of HZTI・s r01e of providing
SuPPOrt at the nationallevel．At the same time，there does not
Seem tO be anYindustrial consensus about the shape and direction
Of a Hnew r01eH for近工TZ・Catching－uP With the West removed the
HtechnologiCal signpOStSl．that had assistedin the formation of
a government－industrY COnSenSuS for the design Of past，
”application－Oriented”schemes．　Basic research is tYPICally
COnCerned with fostering long－term HcreativityH and is often
PrOne tO drift awaY from the more rigOrOuS disciplines that are
imposed by firms，”current commercial commitments一一・　Companies
that are activelYinvoIvedin the conduct and exploitation of
basic research findit hard to generate accurate　一．visions．．for
the future・　The need to cover the”techn0logiCal waterfront”
means that much of the research work wil1eventuallylead to
benefits that are only of limited orindirect value・　Ztis
difficult to produce sharply－focused research agendas that are
CaPable of close correlation with the future ev01ution of．．user
requirements”．Such a taskis even more difficult for government
agencies．
The question of the justification for governmentalintervention
to support ZTis assessedin Section　3．　Attentionis drawn to
the nature of government views on the HideologiCal acceptability”
Of support for c01laborative research as part of an attempt to
answer the question：“Why should governments beinv01vedin＝T？r’・
＝tis argued thatr While government support for basic research
haslong been justified on the grounds of Hmarket failure．1，a
CaSe for supporting research as a means to enhanceindustrial
COmPetitiveness in ZT started to become increasinglY mOre
PrOminent during the1980S．Attempts to promote cOmPetitiveness
throug・hiT researchlead on to the question ofl．what constitutes
ZT policy？日．　As ZT has become more closelY COnneCted with
economic growtht policies that affect＝T have become more closelY
inter－tWined with broader measuresr designed to regulate trade
and enhance competitiveness・　The theoretical model proposed
relates government－SPOnSOred research and development to the
OVerali range of policy options・　Japan′s development of
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collaborative research and Western resPOnSeS are COnSidered
against the background of this modeiin Sections　4′　5and6・
Japanese policies for the development of”targeted”industries
have been mainlY Shaped bY a brand of pragmatismwhich has along
history・The state has played a significant rolein structuring
economic development in Japan since the countrY Started to
industrialise in the late－1800S．　At that time，the fear of
COlonisation bY the United States or a European power helped to
establish the principle of the state acting to manage the market
economy・　＝ntervention to maniPulate the Hinvisible hand”of
CaPitalism subsequently became accepted as alegitimate roie for
the state and has been an important featurein Japan’s post
Second World War development in a rang・e Of newindustries・
Little attention was giVen tOideologiCallY－based concerns with
limitingintervention to correcting・deficiencies caused bYmarket
failure・Government support of”nearmarket”applied development
has been considered to be perfectlYaCCePtable as10ng aSit does
not simply take the form of an unalloYed subsidy to a particular
firm ofindustrial grouping．Rather，the philosophy has tended
to reflect theidea that there should be sufficient competitive
activitYin the system to allow the reciPient Of the subsidy to
digestits benefits without acquiring the economic equivalent of
ObesitY・Competition should be constructivein stimulating rival
firms to make progress without eliminating players from the game・
＝n someinstances，Creating a healthY enVironment forinnovation
has represented thelimit of p01icyintervention．　For example，
Japan，s highlY SuCCeSSful consumer electronics industry was
established with support to create a favourable business
environment usingmacroeconomicp01iciesr generous tax provisions
and compensation for deficiencies in the market mechanism
（Okimoto；1986p549）．The sector than prospered throughJapanese
firms，rapid assimilation andimprovement of US techn010g・iCal
advancesr coupled with sustained capitalinvestmentr effective
process engineering and aggressive marketing．
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BY COntraSt With consumer electronicsr the computer and
Semiconductorindustries were targeted for speciai attention・
HZTI’s image of orchestrating・COllaborative projects which
SuCCeSSfullYenhancedthecompetitiveness ofparticiPating fims′
WaS based oninitiativesin applied rather than basic research・
＝n this respectt pragmatism centred on a clear target：CatChing
up with the west・Ⅱoreovert pragTnatic catch－uP PrO］eCtS tended
to be near market ventures and were not real1y all that
一．C01laborative．．in terms of the〕Oint production and sharing of
knowledge．This modularisation enabled the benefits of so－Called
C011aborative research projects to be HinternalisedH bY
ParticIPating firms without compromising・the distinctive aspects
Of their technologiCal knowledge bases・　Firms did not have to
Share their proprietarY knowledge and so retained elements of
diversitYin their approaches toinnovation・　This meant that
rival firms were pursuing moving・frontiers of best－PraCtice
technology from a range of different angles：therebY PrOmOting
the elements of techn010giCal diversity that drive the very
PrOCeSS Of competitiveinnovation．　Nonaka and YoneYama have
argued that animprecise understanding of the exact capabilities
Of rival firms operatingin semiconductor component markets can
lead to a redoubling of competitive efforts・　A process which
they refer to as”OVerSh00tingHleads to firmsinnovating to a
greater extent than is necessary to capture market share at
SuCCeSSivelevels of techn0logiCal development：therebY Hbidding－
upH the currency of best practice techn010gYin a virtuous cYCle
Ofinnovation（Nonaka and Yoneyama：1992）．
Genuine knowledge sharing has tended to be confined toJapan，s
more basic c011aborative research pro］eCtS Which do not have
immediateimplications for competitive performance・　近OreOVert
the directimportance of these c011aborative projects to the
COmPetitive performance of particiPating firms declined sharply
OnCeJapan started to catch up with best－PraCtice ZT technology・
Thisis somewhat paradoxicalin that the period of declining
reievance has coincided with a dramatic expansionin the West，s
use of col1aboration as a p01icy support mechanism to promote
ー15－
COmPetitivenessin theiT sector using”pre－COmPetitivell（ie”far
frommarket．’）knowledge胃Sharing projects・Zt wasJapan’s success
in applied col1aborative research that gave credibilitY tOits
Fifth Generation Computer Programmet even though the country had
no track recordin this type of basic－reSearCh－driven venture・
Thusrit could be argued that many Westerninitiatives reacted
in the wrong way to the wrong signal．
The subject of Hlessons for the West”arising from Japan’s
experience with c011aborative research draws heavilY On the
example of the UK government，s E350million HAIveY Programme for
AdvancedInformation Techn01ogyl．（1983－1988）・ManY featuresin
the design Of this programme can be traced to the recornmendations
Of a committee establishedin1982under the chairmanship ofJohn
AIvey（Who was then the Senior Director of Technolog‘y at British
Telecom）toimprove the competitiveness of the UK TT sector bY
SuPPOrting”pre－COmPetitiveH c011aborative research．Much of the
］uStification for this programme was based on arguments to
mobilise national resourcesin the face of the challeng‘e POSed
byJapan，s Fifth Generationinitiative．　AIvey stands out as a
notable example ofintervention on the part of a Conservative
Government，led bY Margaret Thatcher，Which was committed to
minimising governmentinterventioninindustrY．The sheer scale
Of the AlveYinitiative was without precedent and the programme
has been described as thelargest single venture ofits type ever
attempted bY the UK during peacetime．　The case－StudY Of the
AIvey programmeis of particularinterest because manY Ofits
features are reflectedin approaches to c011aboration have since
become well established bothin the UK and across Europe with
PrOgrammeS SuCh as ESPR＝T，　Eureka and a host of similar
initiatives．
A furtherimportantmanifestation of c011aborative researchwhich
Can be related to the period f0110wing thelaunch of the Fifth
Generation Programme can be seen in the case of the United
States．　　This shift towards c011aboration was all the more
remarkable because anycollusion of this type hadpreviouslybeen
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PrOhibited by the antitrustiaws which have been animportant
distinguishing feature of the US”innovation system・l・　BY
COntraSt With Japan and Europe′　the commercialisation of
Semiconductors and computers has also featured significant
efforts on the part of new firms（hwerY：1992）．　Zn this
respectr the entrepreneurial flexibilitY Of new firms can aiso
mean that theylack the Mbroad g・aug・e”central core of research
that enables them・tO reStruCture their techn010giCal knowledge
bases to meet the challeng・eS Of dynamic shiftsin the prevailing
technological and commercial environments．
A common feature of manY Western models of collaborationis the
use’．pre－COmPetitive’．research projects as p01icy support
mechanisms to underpin the competitiveness of domestic　工T
industries・　At some pointr the research should become
．1competitivel－　and erstwhile c011aborators are expected to stop
C011aborating and start competing．　One justification advanced
for this model of c011aboration is that it creates a form of
”temporary monopoIY”whereby the differences between rival firms
that normally drive the engine Of competitiveness are suspended・
The aim of the p01icyis to combine the ability of a large
Organisation to devote resources to research，With the active
rivalry ofindependent firms seeking to use exploitation to gain
a competitive advantage．
Part of the case for arguing in favour of horizontal
C01laborative groupingS hing‘eS On theidea that’’the wh01eis
greater than the sum of the parts．．．The hopeis that there will
be a multiplier effect on government funding as project
ParticIPantS SPur eaCh other on to achieve greater techn010giCal
PrOgreSS than would have been possible if they had acted
individua11Y．Nevertheless，While collaboration suddenlY became
Hfashionable”in the1980S，this form of joint researchiS bY nO
means new（the case of Zndustrial ResearchAssociations was noted
in Sectionl）・　C011aborating to share the costs and risks of
research has along historY although，in the past，the value of
SuCh ventures was generally thought to be limited to very
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Particular sets of circumstancest Where the benefits of Hlow胃COSt
access”to research results outweighed anY POtential cornmercial
disadvantag‘eS aSSOCiated with sharing that knowledge with other
ParticIPating・Organisations・For this reasonl firms tend to be
most comfortable with projects that are at the basic end of the
research spectrum．If horizontal co11aborations doinvolve”near
marketH technologieStitis generallY neCeSSarY tO enSure that
there good grounds for expecting that there will be an equitable
distribution of benefitsr aS for example might occurin the
development of an industrY Standard・　OtherwiseT SO－Called
”natural．．C011aborations thatinvolve Hnear market”techn010g‘ieS
frequently centre on the type of non－horizontallinks that exist
between suppliers and customers or firms dealing with
COmPlementary technoIogieS．
While the concept of”market failureH embraces alarge number of
POtential deficienciesin the abilitY Of competition to allocate
resourcesin a desirable manner，the focus of the West，s use of
the term for justifYing government－SPOnSOred researchlies with
the unwiilingness of firms to commit resources tolonger－term
PrOjects where estimates oflikelY COmmerCial returns are subject
to high degree of uncertaintY．　This form of justification for
interventionimplies a primary concern with basic research areas
Which are outside the sphere of．一natural．一　collaborations formed
by firms for commercial reasons．　Yet，SuPPOrt Of far－from－
market－COllaborations as ameans topursue competitiveness relies
On a high degree of optimism about matching research agendas to
evolving market needs・Unless sufficient attentionis giVen tO
POtentiai exploitation routes at the outset，thereis a very real
risk that outputs will faii to feedinto emerging tra〕eCtOries
Of commercial development（Ray：1992）．The fact that research
is c011aborative does notinsulateit from anY Of the traditional
arguments about the uncertainties that arelinked to一一technoiogy
PuShH research projects．　Markets，COmPeting techn0logieS，
Changes in standards′legislation and exogenous shifts in
relative prices can all change dramaticaliYin the time thatit
takes to bring a technologY－PuSh project to fruition：therebY
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reshaping the window of commercial opportunitY thatis availabie
for exploiting‘the technologY（RaY et al：1989）・　At the same
time，PurSuing a research project c01laborativelyalsointroduces
its own problems associated with costs of c00rdinating‘the work
undertaken bY different partners，fears related to the ownership
Of intellectual propertY and non－Performance or withdrawal by
PartnerS during thelife of the pro］eCt・
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Section3：GoverTuent Policies to Support ZnformationTechn。1。gy
Reference has alreadY been made to the”traditional”differences
betweenJapanese and Western approaches tointervention・　This
SeCtion further explores more general aspects of the nature of
interventionin the West andJapan・　＝t concludes by proposing
a”triangular representation”of different p01icY Options・　The
triangleis defined by three basic axis of variationin the
dimensions of government policies：（1）the extent to which the
P01icies are either sector－SPeCific or g‘eneral（ie are they
focused on a singleindustrial sector or do theY affect a range
Ofindustries？）；（2）the degree to which governments shape the
direction and outcome of activities supported under
interventionist initiatives，and；（3）the position of the
P01icies on the spectrumbetween一．supply side”andlldemand sideH・
In some respectsr this could be thought of as a Hfour sided
triangle一，r with time forming a fourth dimension to theimage・
The triangular modeiisintroduced as a point of reference for
Subsequent sections relating to Japanese p01icy and Western
responses・The thrust of the argumentis that，0Vertime，Japan
has pursued a relativelY balanced mix of p01icY OPtions within
the HspaceH defined bY the triang・le of possibilities・While this
mixincludes c01laboration，for various reasons the degree of
COmmerCial relevance associated with that option has declined
Since the mid胃1980S．　BY COntraSt，the West has giVen a g‘reater
PrioritY tO C011aboration during that period・As Section5will
arg．ue′　One COnSequenCe Of this move has been to draw attention
to the disappointing・level of exploitation that can be associated
With public support for pre－COmPetitiver c011aborative research・
One response to the problem ofimproving exploitation has been
to consider a further area of the p01icY triangle concerned with
assisting the diffusion of ZT products・
Western economic p01icies are usuallY COloured bY the relevant
gOVernment’s approach tol■free markets”and．一market failureH to
induceindustrialinvestmentinlonger term research pro〕eCtS・
＝t haslong been recognised that a competitive market systemis
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likelY tO under－investin technologieS that are based on the
PrOduction of new knowledg・e・　TechnologiCal uncertaintY meanS
that firms operatingin a competitive market might not be either
Willing or able to devote a level of resources to10ng－term
research thatis commensurate with ensuring along－term abilitY
to maintain a share of ev0lving markets・　This sub一〇Ptimal
allocation of resources tends to be most pronounced in
technologieS at the basic end of the R＆D spectrum．A prevailing
Viewin free market economiesis that public support for basic
research tends to be less controversial than．．near marketH
research because it is distanced from the coTnmerCial world．　Zn
the early－1960S，Arrow（Arrow：1962）and others argued that
government funding of this tYpe Can Offset this type of market
failure without compromising competition・　Basic researchr by
definition，is not directed towards commercial objectives and
represents what could be described as．●softintervention”．It
increases technologiCal varietY Without exerting anY direct
effect on the economic selection environment．
BY COntraSt，What might be called．一hardintervention”′　Started
to achieve prominence in the West during the1980S・　This
emerging area Of interventionist activity is concerned with
POlicies that aim to create new techn010giCalinfrastructures，
directed towards specific economic growth paths which go beyond
the goals ofindividual firms（Justman and Teubal：1991）・　＝f
these policies are to be effective，　theY require a deep
understanding of the processes which shape trajectories of
innovation and the parallel evolution of the needs of users at
different pointsin the”suppIY Chain一一　between basic components
and finished products（PREST：1992）．　Theidentification of
StrategiC teChn010gieSin advance of marketindicators almost
inevitablY reduces technolog‘iCal variety′　Since there are strong
PreSSureS tO eXClude options that appear to beless favourable・
This reduction in variety impingeS On the breadth of
technologiCal competition′　althoug・h the speed with which firms
PurSue targ‘eted trajectories of innovation is iikely to be
enhanced・　＝n this respect，SuPPOrt for specific technoiogieS
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focuses the competitive process on particular fields of enquirY
at the opportunitY COSt Of restricting the attention paid to
techn010giCal options that embodY a g・reater POtentialif they
Were eXPlored further．
Japan′s interventions to target its infant computer and
Semiconductor component sectors for support during the1960s and
1970s avoided the difficulties that f01low from a reduction in
Variety because they were mainlY Oriented towards transferring
techn010gY developedin the USt to theJapanese environment・The
direction of technologiCal development had alreadY been defined
by US firms・　As the burgeoning literature on ev01utionary
economics has made clear，eStablished technologiCal trajectories
that are supported by a similarly established base of users
generailYhave a powerful”exclusion effect”on alternative forms
Of technologY　－－　eVenif those alternatives embody a g・reater
theoretical potential for exploitation（Georghiou，RaY et al：
1986）・Japan′s rstrategY Of pursuing techn010gy OPtions that
COuld be exploitedin the economic niche excavated bY　＝BM and
Otherleading US firmstinv01vedlittle commercial uncertainty・
The challeng・e Piayed to one ofJapan，s acknowledged strengths・
工tinv01ved the pursuit of relativelY Predictable trajectories
Of techn010giCaldevelopmentwhich centredonknowntechn010giCal
ParameterS・　Thisis seen particularlY ClearlYin the case of
Semiconductor components・　Once successive generations of
techn01ogy had been．．capturedl・t attention could be giVen tO
prOCeSS engineering・　As thelevel of technologY PrOgreSSedr
Japanese fims demonstrated aincreasing ability to develop
PrOduction process techn010gieS Which allowed them tomeet price
and qualitY targetS・　The realisation of economies of scale at
each successivelevel of techn010gY WaS aSSisted bY alarge
domestic market and an orientation towards volume production
Which was unaffected by the HqualitY Puil”effects of defence
PrOCurement p01icies of the tYPe that had been a factor in
Shaping Semiconductor certain aspects of developmentsin the US
and other Western countries・FromJapan・s point of view′　the
PrOblem has comein cases where tra］eCtOries of development are
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less clear asis frequentlY the casein the software engineering・
and AZ（thisis discussed furtherin Section4・2）・
BY COntraSt tO the historY Of governmentinterventioninJapan
Prior to thelatel970sr the challenge to Western governmentsr
that started to address the problem of developing aPprOPriate ZT
SuPPOrt POlicies during the1980S，WaS g‘enerally focused on the
PrOblems of assisting establishedindustries that were being
exposed toincreasingly stronger competitive challenges・　The
］uStification for suchinitiatives was tYPiCally expressedin
terms of the critical roie that can be played bY a StrOng
indigenous capabilitYinIT・　Such an argumentis frequentlY
associated with bids to secure access to state－Of－the－art　工T for
usein defence applicationst and to］uStifY SuPPOrt tO Civilian
ZT users that would be disadvantaged by a dependence on buying
in techn010gY from foreig・n SuPPliers・Itis based on the premise
that the ability to use zT effectivelYislinked to a national
CaPabilitY tO SuPPlyIT．
Promoting a techn010gYin the absence of clear market signals can
be analogous tollpushing a pieCe Of stringlfin the sense that
researchinputs might not be translatedinto commercial outputs：
mechanisms are required to secure investment and giVe
entrepreneurial direction・　Clearly′　advanced ZT research will
Only acquire economic significance if it is exploited
COmmerCially and successful exploitation tYPICallY hinges on
effective diffusion．　This issue of diffusion raises two further
CategOries of”market failure”that are of criticalimportance，
namelY：’lcapability failureTT and　”information failure”・
CapabilitY failure encompasses such things as：deficienciesin
the technical skills required to assimilate new technologY that
embodies a potential advantage over existing waYS Of doing
things；inflexible organisational structures and aninability to
form strategieS Which are appropriate to capitalising on new
technologiCal opportunities．　＝nformation failures relate to
either a shortfallin thelevel of knowledge to make a”rationalf’
decision ort alternativelYt difficultiesin processing・aVailable
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information effectivelY・　While capability and information
failures affect the　＝T industrY in generalr small firms are
especia11y vulnerable to these problems．　0vercoming these
barriers to diffusion represents a formidable challenge to　＝T
P01icy formation．
＝n comparison to the West，the structure and organisation of the
Japanese　＝T industrY tends to mean that the problems of
CaPabiiity andinformation faiiures areless significant．　The
Japanese industrY CentreS On large firms with verticallY
integrated and diversified business activities．　As Nonaka has
noted′　different phases in product development processes in
Japanese firms are overlapping and when necessary staff canlfmove
along with the project一．as research is translated into
COmPetitive advantage・Knowledgeis passed between team members
■’rugbY Style”as pro〕eCtS PrOgreSS tOWards commerCial fruition・
The HintegratedH organisational structures frequentlY foundin
Japanese firms appear to offer greater HcapabilitY一一　than Western
models which feature greater separation between researcht
PrOduction and marketing functions（Nonaka：1991）．
3・2　Towards a classification of ZT poiicies
Once the case for supporting　＝T has been accepted′　thereis a
Wide range and diversity of p01icY meaSureS that can be adopted
as mechanisms for assisting ZT・These might focus directlY On
＝T orr alternativelYt include　＝T as a component part of more
broadlY－based policy packagesr designed to promote economic
growth and national competitiveness・　Zn both cases，thereis
also scope forimplementing policies at different points on the
SPeCtrum between hard and softintervention．　One further source
Of variation′　that occursin the case of p01icies directed
SPeCifically at the　＝T sector，is associated with the extent to
Which the policies address demand or suppIY－Side factors・　A
COnVenient waY Of classifYing different tYPeS Of support
mechanisms has been proposed by Guy and Arnold（Guy：1991）．
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Policies that affect the production and use of ZT can be
Characterised′in very general terms，aS being either”sector－
SPeCificH or．lenvironmentail．in nature．　The former categorY
COmPrises policies that are targeted specificallY On the　＝T
SeCtOr and mightinclude such things as government－SPOnSOred R＆D
PrOgrammeS，　PrOCurement COntraCtS and schemes to promote
awareness・　At a more general level，enVironmental support
SChemes represent broad－brush measures that can be exploited by
the ZT sector as well as by other sectors of the economY（for
example，taXincentives and regionai development aid）・
Both tYPeS Of policy provide scope for emphasis whichis either
．．deveiopmenta11．0r．lregulatoryr．r With the difference being
determined．to a large extent，bY the deg‘ree Of government
directionimplicitin the action・　Developmental policies have
a directed′　Hhands－On”character．　Firms are encouraged′　Via
P01icies such as procurement，tO follow paths which areintended
to fulfil prioritiesidentified bY the state，With the result
that technolog‘iCal varietyis reduced．BY COntraSt，regulatorY
POlicies such as theliberalization of telecommunications，are
more”hands－Off一．and do notinvoIve specifYing how economic or
technical development is to take place．　R＆D tax incentives
COnStitute a一．hands－Off”p01icy一meaSurebecause governmentis not
invoIvedin decisions concerning the tYPe Of R＆D undertaken by
firms′　Whereas governmentisinvolvedin such decisionsin the
allocation of loans or subsidies for specific R＆D projects・
These latter examples illustrate．．hands一〇nH or deveiopmental
p01icy measures．
Within the spectrum of sector－SPeCific policiesritis possible
to distinguish three broad policY tYPeS：．．demand－Side．一　actionsr
Hsupply－SideH actions and．lbridgingH actionsr eaCh of which can
be further sub－dividedinto a range of policY OPtions・SuppIY－
Side initiatives are oriented primarily towards b01・Stering
indigenous ZT suppIYCaPabilitY，Whereas demand－Side policies are
intended both to stimulate demand fromindigenous producers and
toimprove the efficiency of user sectors via the diffusion of
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工T products and services，be they supplied from indigenous
SOurCeS Or from elsewhere・Bridging actions aim tolink supply－
Side and demand－Side actions rather than relying‘Onindependently
COnCeived”technologY－PuShH and”demand－Pu11、”measures・
工n the broader sphere of Henvironmental．■　measures．itis more
difficult to describe actions simpIY aS SuPPIY－Side or bridging
POlicies．　Thisis partly a consequence of one person’s suppIY
being another person，s demand・For exampler non－SeCtOr－SPeCific
CaPital equipmentinvestments can be considered as suppIYqSide
measures bYIT producers when used to purchase new production
equiPment for their own use′but theseincentives can be regarded
equallY aS demand－Side measures when users take advantage of them
to purchase ZT products．　SimilarlY，COntrOl ofinterest rates
Can be used simultaneousIY tO regulateinvestmentin new plant
and toinfluence the overalllevel of demandin the economY．
The ZT PolicY Triangle defines three main p01icy clusters．
C1uster A Hands－Offr Non－SeCtOr SpeCific′　SuppIY－Side p01icies
General R＆D tax incentives．　Available to all firms from a
Variety of sectors，With government havinglittle or no saY
in the type of R＆D conducted．
Cluster B Supply sidel Hands一〇nt Sector Specific Policies
These policies range from the direct subsidy of national
ChampiOnS tOIT R＆D programmesin areas that are deemed to
be strategiCallY important・　Government usually has a
StrOng SaY in the choice of priority areas and in
SanCtioning particiPation．
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C1uster C Secto上－SPeCific′　Demand－Side′　Hands－Off p01icies
A good example of this is an IT equiPment diffusion
incentive．　BY Stimulating general demand for ZT goodsit
is possible to benefit the　＝T sector．
Although there are a wide diversity of p01icyinstruments which
Can be used to stimulateIT R＆D，the maininstrumentsin use tend
to fall int0　0ne Or mOre Of the three main clusters．　Cluster B
POlicies（SuPPIY－Side，hands一〇n and sector specific）are almost
universally applied and constitute the main p01icYinstruments
in manY COuntries．Government－SPOnSOred collaborative research
fitsinto this categorY，althoughits practicalimplementation
Varies significantly between countries．As the next section wili
make clearr a main feature of theJapanese caseis not so much
its use of c011aboration butits deployment of a mix of policiesr
Which c011ectivelY COVer mOre than one policY Cluster．It could
be argued that problems with the exploitation of techn01ogY PuSh
C011aborative projects hasled to a growing realisationin the
West that Cluster C p01icies（SeCtOr－SPeCific，demand－Side and
hands－On）can be important instruments for stimulating the
diffusion of ZT・　BY COntraStr it could be argued that close
linkages between techn010giCal development and the evolution of
different points on the．．user chain”have been an enduring
featurein the development ofJapan・sITindustry・
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4　　Japanese ZT PolicY and the use of Engineering Research
Associations
The pragmatic dimension to Japanese government p01icy for
industrial development has sometimes prompted the diagnosis that
thereis more concern with Hwinning the gameH than creating a
”1evel plaYing‘fieldH．　Supporters of the”Japan　＝ncorporated”
View often promote animag・e Of：虻ITI as the central headquarters
Of anindustrial p01icy formation mechanism thatis distrustful
Of governmentlaissez－faire capitalism and a keen advocate of
”hands一〇nH intervention．　　However，　the extent to which
Subscribers to the metaphor actuallY COnSider Japan t（〕be
”incorporated”varies considerablY．
Some of the more extremeinterpretations of thel．incorporated”
View can giVe the misleading impression that Japan is an
integrated′　mOnOlithic entitY Whenr it reality′　there is
generally strong competition between firms and frequent
disparitiesin the relative positions adopted bYindustrY and
different government ministries．Indeed．many of the supporters
Of the”Japan Incorporated一一　view would probablY agree that
COmPetition has played animportant r01einJapaneseindustrial
POlicY and acknowiedge that in certain circumstances，
”Schumpeterian”　competitive rivalry′　inv01ving the use of
techn010giCalinnovation to capture anincreased share of the
market，is at the verY heart ofJapan，s economic development・
Their pointis thatJapanese government p01icy has operatedin
terms of a”desirablel－1evel of competition′Whichis related to
the relative ability ofJapanese firms to competein a national
Or global arena．　From an external viewpoint，this can giVe an
impression of an”incorporatedH system・　Newindustries mightt
for examplel be afforded protection and subsidies until they are
SufficientlY Well established to stand on their own feet・in
PraCtice，thisinvoIves the use ofintervention to over－ride free
market mechanisms and therebY　”short－CircuitH the market
Selection process．
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Thereist of courser no guarantee that this short－Circuiting
PrOCedure will be effective．　Competitive rivalrY frequently
ieads to the production of alternative technical solutions to a
Particular problem・　A reduction in rivalrY Can mean that
technologiCal options which do not appear to embodY muCh
POtentiai for commercial exploitation arediscountedmorequicklY
than would otherwise have been the case．　This can cause ma］Or
PrObiemsif the market selectionmechanism fails to evolvein the
Way that was predicted and′　aS Okimoto has pointed outT MITI has
made some costly errors（Okimoto：1989p4－7）・However，the case
Of the computerindustrYis acclaimed widelY aS an eXamPle of
K＝T＝　Hgettingit rightt一．
With regard to assessing the extent of the government，s r01ein
Japan，s rapidindustrial development，Hart has noted that the
Small group of Western sch01ars who write seriously aboutJapan
is divided between those who see the role of the state as being
Central to the countrY，s economic development and those who
believeit to be more peripheral（Hart1992：P37）・　While the
importance of the state－industry partnership is generally
acknowledged′　there is often considerable debate about who
actually haS the upper hand．In some respects′　the debateis
red01ent of features associated with past concerns about whether
innovation was a product of HtechnologY PuShH or”need puil－f・
A widely－aCCePted way of dealing with this difficultY OCCurred
With growing‘interestin a．lcombination view”wherebyit was
POSSible to subscribe to both models simultaneously，but wi・th a
degree of emphasis that varied according to contingent factors
SuCh as the tYPe Of techn010gYin question，its reiative maturitY
and so on・BY the same token，it could be argued that thereis
a”middle ground”which can be used forinterpretingJapanese
SuPPOrtinitiatives・　The nature of this middle ground varies
OVer time and according to the techn010gYin question：itis
COntingent upon prevailing circumstances．
Japan piOneered the interventionist p01icies to support the
COmputerindustrYin theiate－1950S．At that time，the country
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recognised theimportance of building a computerindustry and was
quick to see the strategiC advantage that would arise from
techn010giCal spillover into related areas such as
telecommunications．Although the techn010gy was new andin manY
WayS Of unproven valuer companies alreadY engaged in
manufacturingtelecorrLmunicationsequiPmentandelectronicdevices
Were keen to take advantage of government support to trY and
exploitits potential as a high－Value－added extension to their
business activities・Legislation was passedin1957　to exempt
COmPuter teChnology from anti一mOnOPOlylawputin place under the
US Occupation・　MIT＝　helped to prioritise the acquisition of
relevant technologY byJapanese firms and thereby established a
Pattern for government support to promote the development of the
COmPuter and relatedindustries．A criticalingredientin this
Pattern Of support has beenits consistencY・　For most of the
POSt－War Period′Japan has been ruled bY the Liberal Democratic
PartY Creating a record of political stabilitY that is
unprecedented amongst the world′slarge democracies・　Against
this background of stable governmentr the MinistrY Of
工nternational Trade and Zndustry　（ⅡZTI）　has achieved
extraordinarY SCOPe for autonomous action（Okimoto；1989　p181）・
Japan’s political stabilitYhas been matched bY Stable population
Ofleading＝T firms．By contrast with the　＝Tindustriesin many
Western countries′　theJapanese　＝TindustrY has not experienced
the effects of significant restructuring caused bY mergerS and
takeovers・　Such activities are comparatively rarein Japan・
interlocking patterns of company ownership associated with
Japan，s keiretsu－－business groupingS Centred on either a bank
Or a SuPPlier chain dominated bY a leading‘manufacturer　－－
provide a s01id financial base for supporting longer term
investments．on occasions，keiretsu are able to create barriers
to foreign ParticIPationinJapanese businesst for example′　bY
PreVenting the acquisition of a Japanese company that could
PrOVide a gateway to the domestic market・　At the same time′
internal competition between companiesin a particuiar sector
belonging tO different keiretsu tends tointensified・
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Japan’s tradition of lifetime employment mitigates against
technology transfer being brought about by the movement of
individuals between organisations and the formation of Hspin－Off”
COmPanies to develop specific techn01ogieS．Japan，sleading　＝T
COmpanies have Hbroad gauge”techn010gical knowledg‘e bases which
tend to include more across－the胃board coverage of relevant
technologieS thanis the casein many of their more specialised
Western counterparts・　Boundaries between companies tend to be
much stronger than in the West and，While there is close
interaction at theinterface with suppliers and customers，the
l’true coref－is we11guarded from competitors（thereby providing
SCOPe for the　一一〇VerShooting，，phenomenon mentioned earlier）．
The development ofJapanese ZT p01icY has followed from along－
term dialogue between H＝Tf and the ma］Or firms operatingin the
IT sector・In the course of this dialogue，MITI and the firms
have reached a highlevel of　－1understandingl．about the basis on
Which policy support measures are giVen・　Failure of firms to
abide by the accepted”rulesH could result in them being
disadvantagedin future H＝T＝initiatives．　While the relative
importance of MIT＝　and the private firmsis matter for debater
the growth of Japan，s IT industrY has been impressive・
Anchordoguy′s sch01arly analysis of howJapan built a computer
industry hasidentified four dimensions toJapanese government
P01icies：　PrOteCtionist regulation；　heavY Subsidies；　the
establishment a national company to rent domesticaliY－PrOduced
COmPuterS tO Japanese users at very favourable rates and；
COOPerative R＆D projects（Anchordoguy：1989p15）．
MZTl，s first step towards building a computerindustrY WaS tO
impose contr0ls on computer－related foreigninvestmentinJapan
and reStrictimports・IBHJapanJ Which was established as alOO
Per Cent SubsidiarY Ofits American parentin1950r was put under
PreSSure bYH工TZ to share techn010gYWith theJapaneseindustrY・
In1960，IBMwas persuaded to giVeJapanese computer firms access
toits patentsr althoughthe strategYWaS nOtentirelYSuCCeSSful
aS nO arrangement was made for the practical transfer of ZBM
－32－
technolog‘y tO theJapaneseindustrY（Fransman′1990：P27）．
An effective．一bridging p01icY”to support Japanese computer
manufacturers and users was established bY the formation of the
Japan Electronic Computer Company（JECC）in1961．At a time when
users tended to rent rather than buy computers，JECC bought
SyStemS from Japanese suppliers and rented them to domestic
CuStOmerS at Subsidised rates．vendors received a prompt return
On their investment，While interest－free loans from the JECC
provided capital to supportimprovementinnovations・0ver a　20
Year Period，＄2　billioninlowinterest governmentloans was
ChannelledintoJECC（Anchordog・uY：1990）．　Although this sum
might appear relatively small bY tOday・s standards the key point
to noteis thatr at the time′it represented a significant amount
Of moneYin relation to what the firms themselves were able to
SPend・　Horeoverf the scheme preserved some aspects of market
Selection mechanismsin thatit helped firms who were prepared
to help themselves・Although computers produced bY fBM during
this period were frequently cheaperl mOre reliable and more
POWerfull Japanese public p01icy was oriented towards along－
term view of efficiency based on the ultimate acquisition of an
indigenous state－Of－the－art CaPability・
The fourth dimension toJapan′s p01icY for TT has centred on
government－SPOnSOred c011aborative R＆D projects・　During the
Period since the　1960S，　C011aborative research schemes
OrChestrated by government agencies have become firmlY
established as a ma］Or Vehicle for public p01icy in the
development of theJapaneseindustrY・　These schemes typICallY
involve hori2：Ontal groupingS Of rival firms，tOgether with the
ParticiPation of government agencies or researchlaboratories・
The aimis to use c011aboration as a vehicle for sharing the
COStS and uncertainties of technologiCal developmentin order to
enhancelong’－term COmPetitiveness．
Although Western commentators often speak asif collaborative
research wasintrinsicaliYJapanese，MIT工′s sYStem Of research
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associations actually has foreign OriginS．　工n thelate－1950S，
the Director of HZTZ，s Mechanical Engineering Research
IJaboratory．Dr］旺asao SugimOt0．WaS impressed by the British
SyStem Of Research Associations（Levy and Samuels：1989　p31）・
These associations had beenintroducedin1921to counter concern
that Britain wasl00Singits technologiCalieadership・Similar
associations was subsequentlY Createdin a number of European
COuntries and′　although there was considerable diversitYin the
WaYSin which the British prototYPe WaSimplementedin different
national environments，a ma］Or SurVeyPublishedin1965reflected
a generallYlowlevel of respect for the achievements of these
bodies（W00dward：1965）．Nevertheless，Sugimotowas particularly
interestedin the assistance giVen bY the British government to
Small and medium－Sized firms and sought to transfer this feature
Of support toJapan．　The first research associationsinJapan
Were ad hoc ventures to support the manufacture of parts for
motor vehicles・　Zn1961′　the ERA system was put on a formal
basis by the Research Association for the Promotion of Hining‘and
Zndustrial Techn01ogY Act・Thislaw gave research associations
the status of alegal corporation which had the effect of making
it possible for them to receive significant tax benefits・Zn the
Period up unti11965，12　ERAs were established in a range of
SeCtOrS．
Between1965　and1970，there was a moratorium on ERAs．　This
Period coincided with thelaunch of H＝T＝，s National R＆D Programme
（Often referred to as theiarge－SCaie project）which represented
theJapanese government，s first attempt to financelOO per cent
Of the costs of certain R＆D projects carried out bY Private
firms・At the timeit was believed that this form of support
PreCluded the possibilitY Of organising c00Perative research
SChemes・Howeverrit was subsequentlYdecided that the two forms
Of support could complement each other andit became standard
PraCtice for工旺工T＝toimplement national projects through the use
Of cooperative research projects（Kodama1991p86）．　A rapid
expansionin the number of ERAs f0110wed and anincreased number
Oflarger firms becameinvolved as MITI started to use ERAs for
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broadlY－based national projects in areas such as
microelectronicsr materials science and biotechnology・
Prior t01980，COmPuter－related ERAs had been concerned with
transferring existing technology toJapanese firms・Japanese
hardware and component manufacturers caught up with US best－
PraCtice techn010gyJ Which have been seen as a sign that ERAs had
SerVed their purpose・　Zn the eventr a new type of ERA was
PiOneered which was designed to push back the frontiers of basic
research・　While the Fifth Generation Computer Project perhaps
PrOVides the most publicised example of this phenomenonl Similar
initiatives were launched in optoelectronics and component
technologieS for a supercomputer・Unlike previousIT ERAsr which
Were．’distributed”in that particIPantS WOrked from their own
Premises′　these three new－StYle projects have been run from
Central researchinstitutes・Withless proprietarY knowledge at
Staker c011aborators evidently feel more happY With closer
COOPeration（LevY and Samuels：1991p140）．
4・1　A・Review of HITl．s Conputer－related ERAs
The computer industry has seen more Engineering Research
Associations（ERAs）than any otherindustrial sector，reflecting
the potentiallY high returns fromincreased market shares that
Can be gained as a consequence of c00rdinated techn010giCal
innovation・　These ERAs may be traced from the Computer Basic
Techn010gY Research Association which was launched in1962　to
helpJapanese manufacturers build a machine that would be able
to compete with　＝BM′s second generation1401series．　工tlasted
untii　1966　and funded on　50：50　basis bY MZTZ and the
Participating firms．　The association was also known as the
FONTAC project，Which drew the first threeletters ofits name
from theinitials of the particIPating companies：Fujitsu，Oki
Electric and NEC．Fujitsu worked on the main processor and punch
Card equiPment，While Oki and NEC addressedissues reiated to
Sub－PrOCeSSOrS andinput／outputequipment・Researchwas donein胃
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house and there was minimal communication between the
Participating companies（Fransman：1990p29）・＝n manY reSPeCtS，
the FONTAC project could be regarded as being unsuccessful・
Integration of the modules produced by the participating
COmpanies was problematic．　Moreover，in the meantime，ZBH had
introducedits　360　series machines which effectively rendered
the project，s outputs obsolete．
HZTZ’s response to　＝BH，S　360　series machines took the form of the
VerY High Speed Computer System（VHSCS）which waslaunchedin
1966・　Zt lasted for six YearS under the overall technical
leadership of MIT＝，s Electro－Technical LaboratorY（ETL）．　BY
COntraSt With the FONTAC project，the VHSCS invoIved all six
ma］Or COmPuter manufacturers：therebY defining the basic format
for particiPation that existed through most of the subsequent
ERAs・There was a clear division oflabourin the project with
Hitachi，Fujitsu and NEC working on mainframes andintegrated
Circuitsr while Oki Electric，Mitsubishi Electric and Toshiba
WOrked on peripheral equiPment・　Hitachi t00k thelead and ETL
PrOVided some of the more basic researchinput・　Although the
PrOject achieved most ofits objectives there was still a wide
gap with IBM・　Many of the more significant benefits were
indirect・　According to Fransman（Fransman：1990p32），muCh of
the background to NEC，s current domination of the world market
for memorY devices can be traced toits specialisationin this
techn010gY during the VHSCS pro〕eCt・　There was verYlittle
Sharing of knowledge createdin the pro］eCt and none of the　39
PatentS PrOducedinv01ved tw00r mOre COmPanies（Fransman：1990
p34）．
The gap with the US was made all the more apparentin1971when
thelaunch of ZBⅡ′S　370　series once again outflankedJapan・s
efforts（and also forced RCA and GE out of the USindustrY）・
MZTI felt that there were t00　many COmPuter manufactures to
COmPeteeffectivelyand soughtto strengthentheJapan′s position
bY PrOmOting the formation of national champiOnS・Substantial
financial assistance was promisedif the six ma］Or firms agreed
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to some for of rationalisation into tw0　0r three groups・
However，a COmbination of strong resistance bY the firms and a
Significant cutin MZTZ，s budget bY the丸inistrY Of Financemeant
that the proposed mergers never t00k place・　M＝TZ，s poiicY
instead centred on the formation of a further ERA．
The New Series project ran from1972　to1976　and was something
Of a turning pointin thatit allowedJapanese manufacturers to
divide up the market so that theY COuld co11ectivelY PrOVide a
full range of products that were capable of presenting an
”across－the－board”challenge to　工BM．　Zt was the firstJapanese
PrOject to aim atIBM compatibilitY．　Government subsidies of
70・3billion yen were made available to particIPating firms who
Were then required to contribute a similarlevel of funding from
their own resources．
MZTl forced the six firmsin the project to form three teams
although，in practice′　the fims remainedindependent and there
WaS COnflict both between and within the partnerships・　Fujitsu
and Hitachi worked on thelargest machines which represented a
direct challenge toIBM，s domination of the world market for
mainframe computers．　NEC and Toshiba worked on middle－Sized
machines，While Mitsubishi and Oki focused on smaller computers・
Extensive use was made of private links that the Japanese
COmPanies had been able to establish build with US firms．　BY
exploiting theselinks，theJapanese companies were more easily
able to assimilate the techn010gieS that were necessarY tO enSure
COmPatibilitywith＝BHmachines．The project，s strategyappeared
to be highlY effective and wasinstrumentalin enablingJapanese
hardware producers to match the performance of　工BM：370　Series
machines at prices whichr bY19701Were between15　and　20　per
Cent lower．　For the first time，Japanese and US producers
COmPeted head－On．
Japan，s progress in hardware during the late－1970sr focused
attention on the USleadin verylarge scaleintegrated circuits
（VLSI）and gave rise to the famous VLSI project which ran from
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1976　to1980・It cost　72　billion Yenr　30　billion of which was
provided bY the government．Huch of the justification for the
project hadits originSin the realisation that the US had a
head胃Startin the development of VLS＝　circuits associated with
・・fourth generation一一　computing・＝n1975r ZBH was rumoured to be
COntemplating a Hfuture system・・iine of computers using VLSI and
HZTI，s view appeared to reflect theidea that theirwere t00manY
COmPuter makersinJapan to cope with a giantlikelB虻・　The
PrOject might also be seen as a competitive response to a similar
VLS工　projectlaunchedin1975　by NTT which gave substantial
financial support to NEC，Hitachi and Fujitsu・HIT＝　evidentlY
felt that NTT hadintrudedintoits territory（AnchordoguY：1989
P140）and sought to establish alarger project whichincluded
five of the six domestic manufacturers：NEC，Toshiba，Hitachi，
Fujitsu and Mitsubishi．Oki was excluded as a consequence ofits
failure to exploit the results of the New Series Computer Project
and also because the company was experiencing severe′financial
PrOblems which cast doubt over the probability thatit would be
able to make a useful contribution to the venture．
Research was carried out at three sites：　a COOPerative
laboratory；　the Computer Development Laboratories，（CDL）
established jointlY bY Hitachi，Fujitsu and Hitsubishi；and NEC
Toshiba工nformation Systems（NTIS）Laboratories owned jointly by
NEC and Toshiba．　The c00PerativelaboratorY WaS distinguished
bY the fact thatit existed on a single site and was staffed bY
research engineerS fromall five particiPating companies，aS Well
as members of the Electrotechnical LaboratorY Whichis part of
hZT工′s Agency forlndustrial Science and Techn01ogY・According
to Okimoto et ai，the work at thislaboratorY COnCentrated on
COmmOn basic techn010gieS Which only accounted for a minor
PrOPOrtion of the project，s overall research activities．　The
main part of the project was concerned with applied development
ieading to more immediate commercial exploitation and was
undertaken bY the companies（Okimoto et al：1984p19）．
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The VLSI project is generallY aCCiaimed to have been an
OutStanding success．considerable advances were madein process
techn01ogy and by1980rJapanese firms became worldleadersin
VLSZ by producing products that exhibited1．5　micron feature
SiZeS・　These achievements helped Fujitsu，NEC to introduce
highlY COmPetitive fourth generation computers．Theproject also
PrOduced overl′000　patents′　althoughless than　20　per cent of
these were］OintiY held bY mOre than one companY・
Tn corrLmenting on the r01e of MITZin the success of the project，
a Director of one of the］Oint researchlaboratories has been
quoted as saYing：”‥・The r01e of HZTZ wasimportant・　AIso′
much more money went to NT＝S than to the〕Oint research
laboratories・　That money was heipful for theindividual five
COmPaniest Z think′　tO develop practical technologieS・”
（Fransman：1990　p97）・　Theimplication appears to be that the
PrO〕eCt emPhasised thepracticaldevelopment of techn010gYrather
than］Oint research・In this respect，the project fallsinto the
”catch－uP CategOrYH as Okimoto has observed；
Even the heralded VLSZ project（1976－1980），hailed as an
unprecedented model of collaborative research failed to
push semiconductor technology beyond the frontiers of
knowledge（except perhaps in liquid crYStal dispiays）．
While the VLS工　PrOject did advance the state ofJapanese
Semiconductor knowledg・e′　eSPeCially in the area of
production techn01ogY（eg silicon crYStal growth and
PrOCeSSing），Japanese companies probablY WOuld have made
SuCh advances anywaY．　　＝f so′　the project，s main
accomplishment maY have been to hasten the timetable of
developmentt a nontrivial but hardlY reV01utionarY
accomplishment．
（Oklmoto；1986　p541）
With hindsight，the VLSr project maY be seen as representing the
COnClusion of the catch－uP era・　The HadditionalityH of the
PrOject achieved by government funding（ie outputs thatwould not
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have been produced in the absence of government funding）was
evidentin anincreasein speed with which firms were able to
pursue a trajectory that had been more－Or－1ess defined bY the US
industryleaders・Given the problems that existed with several
Of the earlier computer ERAs and theinitial reluctance of firms
to particIPatein the VLS＝venture′itisinstructive to consider
Why the eventual outcome was widelY aCClaimed to be a success・
One of the keY factorsin this success seems to have been clear
techn010g‘iCal objectives that were directly relevant to the
business strateg‘ieS Of all the particIPating firms・Exploitation
routes were apparent at the during thelife of the pro］eCt and
gave direction to the research．　While the firms，competitive
instincts were to avoid c01laboration，thelevel of government
funding was sufficient to persuade them that failure to take part
WOuld place them at a serious disadvantage relative to
ParticiPating firms・（The project enabled participating firms
to double or even treble their potential research expenditures
On relevant aspects of semiconductor techn01ogY・）　It was a
market－Oriented venture which introduced the possibility of
delivering tangible commercial benefits within a relativelY Short
t⊥me．
ParticIPationin the VLS＝　project gaveJapanese firms what the
US Semiconductor　＝ndustrial Association regarded as g‘OVernment
Subsidies which would be in breach of the American Anti胃Trust
Laws・　It was a source of trade friction；along with unfair
tariffs（Japan12％　verses USA　6％），Preferential treatment of
Japanese suppliers bY NTTt allegations of．ldumping”and a high
trade surplus（Imai：1983　p3）．　BY COntraSt With this Hin the
marketH orientation of the VLSI pro］eCtr the next chapterin
光ZTI，s historY Of computer related ERAs t00k a verY different
turn toward basic research．
H＝TI’s high－PrOfile Fifth Generation Projectinvolved ambitious
Plans to develop a new dimension of computing・While earlier
generations of computers were associated with component
techn010gieS in the form of thermionic valvesr discrete
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transistors and VLSIr the fifth generation centres on computer
Performance characteristics．　Fifth generation computers were
intended to understand spoken instructionsr emulate human
reasoning and explain how conclusions are reached　一一in short，
a machine that embodied artificialintelligence（A＝）．Advances
in VLSZ had introduced the possibilitY that traditional Von
Neumann computer architectures，in which processing functions
Were Performed sequentia11Yr COuld be replaced with parallel
processing・　The practical realisation of parallel processing
COuld create scope for the enormousincreasesin computing power
that would be required for AZ．　Planners of Japan，s fifth
generation pro〕eCt enVisag‘ed that”thinking．l computers would
PrOVide solutions t0　long－Standing problems such as p00r
Performance in software development and low white collar
PrOductivity（Unger：1987　p9）・They would be”machines for the
1990S”・　From the West，s point of view′　this was a formidabie
Challenge from a countrY that had hitherto been animitator・
Moreoverl Japan was threatening to take up the baton of
leadershipin a techn010giCal area that had been much discredited
bY eXtraVagant Claims on the part of AI enthusiasts・
Although foreign Organisations wereinvited to particiPatein the
FGCS project，　the eventual outcome was an all－Japanese
initiative．　Work began in Apri11982　at ICOT，Which is a
SPeCiallY Created central research facility′10Catedin TokYO・
This use of a central research facilitY WaS a nOtable changein
direction from the policY adopted bY MZTI，s preceding closer－t0－
market cooperative pro］eCtS Where，With the exception of the VLS＝
PrOject，firms conducted their work on their own premises（the
SO－Ca11ed．，distributed”model of c01laboration）・　The basic
nature of ZCOT，s research was probabiy a ma］Or factor in
COnVincing firms that cornmercial confidentiality would not be a
PrOblem with this more open form of collaboration・　Howevert
CusumanO has noted thatr of the particIPating firmsJ OnlY the
COmPany that agreed to produce the hardware showed anY enthusiasm
for the project．　He suggests that part of the reason for this
might have been apprehension about the r01e of the central
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research facility′　although a moreimportant factor was perhaps
the riskY and difficuit nature of a pro］eCt that seemed to have
noimmediate commercial applications（CusumanO：1991p411）・
＝COT was staffed bY reSearChers seconded from the eight
industriai particIPantSin the pro〕eCt：Fujitsu′　Hitachi，NEC，
Toshibat Mitsubishit Okil Matsushita and Sharp・1n addition to
SupPOrting the central research facilitY，the FGCS project also
SPent a Substantial amount ofits budget on research contracts
Placed with the particIPating firms．　Funding for the pro］eCt
Came entirelY from the government and′　at the end of the
PrOject，s original10胃yearlife－Span，SOme　54　billion yen had
been spent．　Although H＝T＝　had planned that the participating
firms would donate matching funding to the overall project
budget，in the event，theindustrial contribution waslimited to
Sending researchers to the central research facility at the
government，s expense・　tn19851there were　50　researchers andr
by the end of1990，there were aboutlOO researchers・
Phase one，　from　1982　t0　1984′　aimed to develop basic
techn01ogieS・The next phase was to generate the building blocks
Of computers capable of Hreasoning．T and the final phase between
1989　and1992　was designated as the period within which the
PrOtOtYPe fifth generation machine would be constructed・　This
WaS enVisaged as Huser friendlYH machine with lOOO parallel
PrOCeSSOrS・While the pro］eCt WaS able to meetits targets for
Phase onel Subsequent goals proved to be more difficult and there
WaS also a growing divergence between ZCOT research and the more
immediate commercialinterests of particiPating firms・　As the
PrOject approachedits conclusion，a Critical articlein Nature
（26th March1992）proposed that the Fifth Generation project
illustrated the problems ofJapan，s rigid bureaucracy′　nOting
that；
By the mid－1980S，it was clear that other approaches to
Parallel computing not based on traditional artificial
intelligence techniquest SuCh as neural networks or the
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massivelY Parallel machines created bY Thinking Hachines
工nc・Of the United States looked more promising・　But
having t01d theⅡinistrY Of Finance thatit would build a
lO90－PrOCeSSOr maChine，H＝T＝　had no choice but to continue
towards that goal．
When ZCOT held aninternational conference to report onitslO
Year WOrk programme，the three largest．．parallel inference
machines”exhibited onlY had　256　parallel processors each（New
Scientist：13thJune1992）．The project was extended for a Year
to pursue further the goal of thelOOO processor machine．It was
SubsequentlY annOunCed that there would also be an additional one
Year eXtenSion，during which time researchers would rewrite
programmes to run on conventional machines．
The Director ofICOT，Kazuhiro Fuchi，defended the projectin his
keYnOte COnference speech claiming that parallel will be a core
for future technologieS that will be able to beyond the framework
Of whatis possiblein conventional computing．　Critics argued
that zCOT，s venture into basic　（as opPOSed to applied）
C011aborative research suffered becauseit was difficult both to
Set gOals and adjust objectives in the light of chang‘ed
Circumstances・Other technologieS Subsequently proved to be of
much greater－than－eXPeCtedimportance but theY Were nOtin the
Original　＝COT plan and　＝COT could not adapt．（For example′　the
entrepreneurial flexibility that had for example enabled Sun
Microsystemsin the US to exploit Reduced Znstruction Set Chips
（RZSC）was not a feature of the lCOT model．）　SimilarlY，
PrOmising approaches to AZ such as neural networks，Which attempt
to mimic the functioning of the human brain，fell outsideiCOT’s
research agenda・　Nikkei Business reported on tensions arising
between the government and the firms′　although the firms did not
Criticise the government openlYr the articie claimed that there
WaS mOunting dissatisfaction the nature of government
initiatives．The case of NEC was cited a firm that was formal1Y
a keen member of tCOT but subsequently tried to distanceitself
from the work・NEC equipment On Show at the1992exhibition did
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not bear the companYlogo to avoid public association with the
PrO〕eCt．While one earlier benefit to NEC from particIPationin
ZCOT was an air crew management system which has been s01d
COmmerCiallY，　this was based on Htraditional techn010gYl．
developedin the first phase of the project（Nikkei Business：
June　29′1992）・
An objective assessment of　＝COT，s achievements is difficult
because the publicity at the beginning of the pro］eCtled to
unrealistic expectations．At a technicallevel，the project was
acknowledged to have produced some notable achievements・
However，there was some divergence between the pro〕eCt，s research
agenda and the paral1el ev0lution of particiPating companies
technological priorities（Washington Post：June2，1992）・During
the project，s firstlO YearS，a tOtal of184　researchers，all
under the age of　35　worked atICOT，s central research facilitY
（New ScientistJune13，1992）・　Yet，While the experience that
theseindividuals gained might be one of the more significant
benefits of　工COT，itis difficult to be clear about the time－
SCale within which these benefits will be realised．
By contrast with the Fifth Generation pro］eCt，M＝T＝，s f01low on
lO Year”Real World Computing programmef．appears to represent an
attempt to circumVent this problem bY uSing a diversitY Of
research strategieS Prior to mid胃term aPPraisal of which
technologies to select for mainstream development（Science，
October　231992）・　The Real World Computer will be oriented
towards a flexible information sYStem With an intuitive
information processing capacitY Similar to that of human beings・
Hajime Zrisawa，Who is a former MITZ official and Executive
Director of the Real World Computing PrograTrLme′has described the
PrOject as”verY basic”：thereis nointention of even building
a PrOtOtyPe COmPuter（TokYO Business：：旺arch1993　p3）．M＝T＝is
expected to provide somethingin the order of　90per cent of the
funding whichis estimated to bein the order of　60million Yen
OVer the lO years・　The pro］eCt aims to create a new
infrastructure for basic research whichis expected toinclude
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a number of non－Japanese organisations・
＝n summary．while the achievements of IT ERAs are cited as
exampies of effective cooperation theY have also embraced a
POtent mixture of competitive rivalry between particiPating
firms・Anchordoguy points out that：
”Cooperativel’R＆D con］ureS uP images of members of
different firms working tog・ether on the same problem・
While this did occur，it was rare．　For the most part，
tasks were assigned to different companies・＝n some casesl
the firms divided up the work and g‘aVe One anOther access
to the resulting‘PatentS；in other cases，the firms split
into groups to take different approaches to the same
PrOblem while agreeing to share results．
（Ancho工－doquy：1989　p43）
Further support for theidea thatinter－firm knowledg・e Sharing
is of comparatively minorimportance to firms particiPatingin
Japan’s national c00Perative projectsis provided by Fransman′s
detailed analYSis of c00peration and competitionininformation
technologyin the Japanese sYStem．　Quantitative surveY data
Obtained from companies particIPatingin five ma〕Or national
PrOgrammeS led him to conclude that：　HAccess to knowledge
COntributed bY Other particiPating organisations was not
generallY felt to be a veryimPOrtant benefit．‥‖（Fransman：1990
P252）・While greater knowledge sharing has been a feature of the
more basic research consortialaunched during the1980S′　this
tYPe‾Of sharing does not inv01ve significant amounts of
PrOPrietarY knowledge．
光IT＝，s c011aborative ERAs show that if certain circumstances
C011aboration between competitors can be of considerable
importance to the development of Japan，s ZT industrY：for
example，the New Series and VLS＝projects stand out as successful
PrOjects．　Yet，it should be stressed that”C01laborating to
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COmPete．．is rarely easY・　Effective collaboration requires a
Sufficientinducement to c01laborate．　TYPICallY thisinvoIves
a sufficientincentive to participate（usuallyif the form of
government funding），a belief that the potential outcomes that
Will be commerciallY relevant and an expectation thatit would
be possible to Hinternaliserl these outputs without leaking
PrOPrietarY knowledge to competitors in the grouping・　The
COmmitment ofindustrial funding to the project can also be a
ma］Or factorin encouraging firms tolink the research agenda to
COmmerCial requirements．
4．2　A Note on Collaborative Software Projects
Zn comparison to its promotion of computer hardware and
COmPOnentS，the historY Of MZT＝，s venturesinto collaborative
research into software have been of limited success．　Prior to
the　1980S，　M＝TI did not channel sig‘nificant funds into
COllaborative software R＆D projects．　While specific projects
have experienced different problemsr Cusumano notes that there
have been some corrLmOn themes：”p00r Planning，disagreements on
Objectives and poor results”（Cusumano：1991p389）・
Of the more recent software projects，S＝GMA（SoftwareIndustrial
GenerationMaintenanceAids）is perhaps worthyof special mention
in thatit represented a high profile attempt to addressJapan，s
emerging”software crisis．一　by automating the production of
SOftware and facilitatingits re－uSe byimproving the qualitY Of
SOftware components・SZGHAwas organised bYHZT工and run through
its Znformation Processing Agency（ZPA）．Work beganin1985and
lasted4・5years・The overall budget was　25billion yenJ Which
Came from government andindustrY SOurCeS（With the size of
industrial contributions being determinedin accordance with the
COmPanY’s turnover）・　A total of194industrial organi5ations
Participatedincluding15　hardware manufacturers，109　software
COmPanies and ll foreign firms with Japan－based operations・
Signa aimed to produce a UN＝Ⅹ　based workstation which could be
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used for developing aPPlications software more efficiently・
F0110wing the project，s completionin1990，the S＝GMA SYStemS
CompanY WaS formed to assistin the commercialisation of the
PrOjects outputs．However，the companYWaS nOt able to coverits
COStS and sales from S＝GHA to01s were negligible・
A ma］Or PrOblem with the SZGMA project was that the to01s
developed did not have anY Significant advantages over the
PrOducts of ma］Or SOftware houses，While the range of t00ls was
limited・Switching to S＝GKA t00ls wouldinv01ve companiesin a
Change of software and hardware to adopt a system thatlacked
SOme Of the facilities provided bY Current teChnoIogY・Another
difficultY WaS that the workstation and software makers who
SuPPOrted other operating sYStemS Were also expected to act a
S＝GMA sales agents and were therebY COnfronted with a direct
COnflict ofinterests．Some critics of S工GMA have suggested that
PrOblems arose because M＝T＝　was trYing・tO PuSh firms towards
technologieS thatlagged behind best practice alternatives・
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5　　The UX Alvey Progra皿me：A Case－Study of a European二reSPOnSe
toJapan’s Fifth Generation Prog‘rame
One of the firstinitiatives that can be directlY related to the
Fifth Generation announcement was the UK government，s AIveY
Programme to promote pre－COmPetitive researchin advancedIT・
Zt is used here to provide a case－Study of HEuropean－StYlel．
COllaboration・　In Europe′　gOVernment P01icies to support
electronics relatedindustries began to emerge as a subject for
debatein thelate1970S・A traditional predilection for Hsoft”
interventionist p01icies to support a more healthyinvestment
environment began to giVe WaY tO mOre blatantlyinterventionist
SeCtOr－SPeCific”strategiC”p01icies．
Prior to the fifth generation announcement，the UK had been
actively seekingindustria11inks withJapanin order to offset
declining‘COmPetitivenessin the domesticIT sector．ICL，Which
WaS Britain，s onlY Significantindigenous computer manufacturerl
had already forgedlinks with Fujitsu and the official view was
that Britain might be able to benefit from furtherlinks with the
JapaneseITindustry・Howeverr approaches made toJapan during
the periodleading up to the October1981”Fifth Generation・l
COnference revealed that the countrY COnSidereditself to be
Self－Sufficientin hardware terms and wasinterestedin gaining
access to British academic expertiseT Particularlyin artificial
intelligence・Oneacademic′ProfessorDonaldMichie′is Reported
to have commented that c011aborating withJapanin this area
WOuld be ratherlike：ffcooperatingwith a vacuumcleaner．f（OakleY
and Owen：1989　p17）・　This concern about a one－WaY flow of
information was reflected widelYin academic′　gOVernment and
industriai circles・One consequence was to focus attention on
how best to emulate theJapanese research effort．
Alveywas set－uP aS the first stagein alO Year Plan toimprove
the competitiveness of the UK ZT sector althoughrin the eventl
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it was onlY funded for five YearS・The programme beganin1983
and broke new groundin thatit was sponsored bY three different
SeCtions of government：the Department of Trade and　＝ndustrY
（DTI），the Ministry of Defence（HoD）and the Science and
Eng‘ineering Research Council（SERC）．Its main thrust was to
SuPPOrt Pre－COmPetitive′　C011aborative research projectsin the
enabling areas of　＝T．Some200C011aborative projectsinv01ving
PartnerS from industry and academia were undertaken and the
OVera11budget was　350　million pounds sterlingr　200　million
POunds of which came from government sources withindustrial
ParticIPantS PrOViding the balance．　For the most part，a
”distributedH model of c011aboration was used with projects
tYPICallYlastingin the order of three years・By contrast with
the Japanese model of c01laboration，there was a verY real
expectation that
between partners．
the partners had
the ownership of
to be cautious in
PrOjects suffered
it t00k to draft
there would be substantial knowledge transfer
Gov rnment funding was not provided until all
Signed a c01laboration agreement which covered
intellectual propertY PrOduced・　Firms tended
heir approaches to these agreements and manY
long d lays as a consequence of the time that
an agreement that was acceptable to all the
PartnerSin the project．
AIveY WaS SuCCeSSful in promoting collaboration between UK
industry and the national science base．　＝t also provided
Valuablelearning experience for the ma］OritY Of particIPantS，
PaVed the way for further c011aboration at the UK and European
levels and offered lessons for the running of a rather more
modest f0110W On PrOgramme tO SuPPOrtlT through the use of
COllaborative R＆D・Revitalising the UKIT sector was rather more
PrOblematic and′in manY reSPeCtSr thelevel of exploitation of
AlveY OutPutS has been disappointing・　＝n some casest barriers
to exploitation arose because of p00rlinkages between R＆D and
PrOduction facilities，　While in other instances technical
difficulties proved to beinsurmountable・　HoweverT there were
also difficulties which arose from the fact the research had been
undertaken as part of a c011aborative project．　Theinvolvement
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Of other partners mean that projects are relativeiyinflexible
in the face of changing COmmerCial circumstances・Hajor changes
in a project，s directioninV01ved gaining the agreement of other
PartnerS and the government．　Project progress might also be
affected bY a divergence between theinterests of the academic
ParticIPantS and the commercially－related concerns ofindustrial
COllaborators・Withdrawal bY PartnerSr following a reappraisal
Of business and technical priorities′　tended to create problems
for other collaborators（Guy，Georghiou，RaY et al：1991p V）・
Anindependent evaluation of the AIvey Programme concluded that
Pre－COmPetitive research and development programmes are we11
Suited to a range of tasks but are notin themselves sufficient
mechanisms to b01ster the competitive performance of the　＝T
SeCtOr・ComplementarY Private sector and governmentinitiatives
are needed to：relate　工T development to users；PrOmOte effort
Within firms to formulate technologiCal strategieS tO facilitate
the exploitation of research，and；a Serious re－eValuation of the
need for patient capital（GuY，Georghiou，RaY et a11991）・　To
Varying eXtends，eaCh of these three　一一deficiencies”areless of
a probleminJapan．
While interventionist policies enabled Japan to build an ZT
industry in the shadow of ZBMr theY have not soIved the
Shortcomings associated with the exploitation of outputs arising
from programmes of basic c011aborative research．Rather support
POliciesinJapaninteracted with theJapanese environment to
Create a”climate forinnovation”throug‘h taxincentives for
research andinfantindustry protection・　This has been helped
bY StruCtural featuresin theJapanese economy・Japan，s success
in consumer electronics was an example of close matching of
innovation trajectories to prevailing patterns of user
requirementst while commercial returns on this effective coupling
process was helped bY a domestic market whichis more than twice
the size of thatin the UK・The absence of high－SPeCification
militarYPrOCurement POliciest COmbined with competition between
a number of domestic producers is also instrumental in
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Stimulating both competitiveinnovation and aggressive pricing‘
P01icies・Japaneseindustrial structure and．in particular，the
broad technologiCal and foundations of theleading・Playersin the
IT sector has been a source of relativelY Patient capital・
Even though c011aborative research does notinitself appear to
be an entirelY SatisfactorY SOlution to the problem of
revitalising the UK　＝Tindustry，it has been retained aleading
POSition in the portfoli0　0f British support mechanisms・　A
SCaled－doⅥl national programme of collaborative research has
followed from AlveY（The　＝nformation Engineering Advanced
Techn01ogY Programme），While an expended commitment has beenmade
to pan－European collaborative research．
Thelaunch of Alvey was f0110wed bY a dramatic expansionin pan－
European c01laborative R＆D under the European CommunitY，s first
Framework Programme（1984－87），Which covered a broad range of
research areas and has been f0110Wed bY Subsequent programmes．
Theseprogrammes areintendedto supportpre－COmPetitiveresearch
projects・A fourth Framework Programme was agreedin1992・The
most prominentITinitiativein the framework schemeis probablY
the European Programme for ResearchinInformation Techn01ogy
（ESPRZT）・　This beg‘an in1984　and covers microelectronics，
SOftware engineeringt computer integrated manufacturing and
advanced lT systems for business and the home・　ESPRIT is a
”techn010gY PuShH initiative without any formal mechanism for
linking projects to the ev0lving needs of　＝T users・　The most
important benefits derived bYindustrial particIPantSin ESPRIT
have been mainlY aSSOCiated withimprovementsin basic know－how
the adoption of more ambitious research objectives（OECD；1992
P76）・ESPRITis complemented by the Eureka Programme，Which aims
to be market－driven・　＝t was launched in1985　by President
Mitterand of France as a response to President Reagan′s StarWars
initiative・　　Eureka provides funding for a variety of
technologieS andinv01ves al112　member states of the European
CommunitY，aS Well as seven other nations in Europe and the
European CoTnmission・One particularlY Significant piece of work
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funded under Eureka in the　＝T sphere is the Joint European
Submicron SiliconInvestigation（JESS＝）project which could be
Seen aS a European response to the USA，s Sematech project，Which
is introduced in the next section．
At the pan－European levelr the，foverheads”associated with
CO11aborative research tend to be amplified bY the geographical
Separation between partners andlanguage barriers・Concern has
been expressed that the”pre－COmPetitive，V emphasis of ESPRITis
PrOducing research thatis a still some considerable distance
from the market and vulnerable to the tYPe Of barriers to
exploitation that beset the AIveY PrOject・　　Successful
COllaboration betweenindustrial firmsis generallY aSSOCiated
With clear research targets which embodY a Ciear potential for
exploitation and are shared by all the particIPantS・　＝n this
respectitisinstructive to consider the case of a’’spontaneous”
European c011aborative response to the Fifth Generation programme
Which was initiated without government funding・　The（ECRC）
EuropeanIndustrY Research Centre located in Munich was the
establishedin1984　as an Anglo－French－German c011aboration bY
ICLt Bull and Siemens・BY COntraSt With fCOTr the ECRC has been
able to shift its emphasis in the light of chang‘ing
CircumStanCeS・Ztis onlY about half the size ofICOT，With some
50　researchers，and has concentrated on more modest projects
Which are coupled to the commercial requirements of partners
（Guardian：Aug131992）．
Co11aboration has become well establishedin Europe as a waY for
SPreading the costs and uncertainties of research．　Yet these
C011aborative ventures frequentlYCentre On reSearCh thatis some
COnSiderable distance from the market and inv01ve academic as
We11asindustrial Collaborators・　Routes to expl0itation are
less clear than was the case of the more successful commerciallY－
OrientedJapanese schemes・The European＝TindustrY also differs
fromJapanin thatitis fragmented and subject to constraints
imposed bY alarge number of relativelY Small national markets・
Differing・nationalprioritiesr coupledwith cultural andlanguage
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barriers，add to the difficuities ofimplementing a concerted
PrOgramme Of action．　At the same time there are restructuring
and adjustmentissues associatedwith successive waves of mergers
and takeovers．This means that the planned HtemporarY mOnOP01Yl’
that would be associated with a c011aborative project is
SOmetimes overtaken bY an aCtual monop01y that occursin the wake
Of moves toward increased industrial concentration．
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6　　　The Rise of Collaboration in the United States
＝n the USA there are a few overtiY Hhands－On”actionsin the
Civilian sphere and a plethora of Hhands－Off．．actionsr both non－
SeCtOr－SPeCific and sector specific・　　The other ma］Or
Characteristic of the US supportis a・range Of sector－SPeCific
actions determined bY the Department of Defense；manY Of which
have a determinedlY hands－On nature．
During the1970S，the United Statesled the worldin component
technologY，COmPuter manufacture and many aspects of what has
Since become known as．tsoftware engineering”・　At the federal
level，the official USindustrial p01icY has been avowedlY nOn－
interventionist：the p01icY WaS nOt tO have a policY・　BY
COntraSt，manyindividuai state governments have along tradition
Of interventionist policies・　Zn practicel federal defence
Spending has performed a key rolein establishing America，s post
Second World War lead in electronics and computer－related
technologieS・National security was used as a justification for
’．hands onH′　SeCtOr－SPeCificinterventionistindustrial p01icies・
Although a relative declinein US′sindustrial competitiveness
OVer the1980sled to calls for a more c00rdinated approach to
industry．these were met with fierce oppositionin official
Circles・　＝n1981′　the Reagan Administration entered the White
House with a strong‘COmmitment to minimal interventionin the
COmmerCialisation of techn01ogY・　＝t was deemed that the
appropriate role for federally－funded researchin the civilian
SeCtOr Should be restricted to supporting basic research・　At
that timer the exploitation of research was a matter for market
forces・　　Nevertheiessr during the course of the　1980st
COllaborationin support of the pursuit of competitive advantage
gained ground and established a trend whichlooks set to continue
into the1990S・Thisis worthy of special note becauseit runs
COntrary tO the tradition of Anti－Trust which has been a verY
deepIY engrained feature of American economic policY・HOreOVer，
in sharp contrast to MITI・s collaborative ERAs and government－
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SPOnSOred European responses to the Fifth Generation Programme′
COllaborationin the US had private sector originS・
Japan’s announcement ofits Fifth Generation Computer Programme
CauSed concern amongst members of the US ZTindustrY and policy－
makers・While the perceived threat was not sufficient to break
the Hanti－Centralist．一　tradition of US politicstit did provide
an opportunity to mobilise Congressional support for anincrease
in funding to established agencies・For examplet the Department
Of Defense，s Defence Advanced Research Project Agency（DARPA）
1aunched a ten Year StrategiC Computing Programmein1983which
Set ambitious targ・etS for the practical demonstration of advanced
AZ and parallel computing‘．The National Science Foundation（NSF）
also expanded the scale of funding for computing and AZ・In
additionr NSF played a piVOtal rolein cons01idating the US，s
leading positionin packet－SWitched networking and computing・
A further policy actionwithimplications for the＝TindustrYWaS
the Strategic Defence Tnitiative（more POPularly known as Star
Wars）・It was first announcedin1983，aS a SPaCe－based sYStem
to defend the US frominter－COntinental ballistic missiles．　BY
1993，the project had consumed some　＄32　bi11ion　一一　mainly on
ambitious military一Oriented pro〕eCtS Which are distanced from
COmmerCial markets．
Outside of government，One Of the early responses to the Fifth
Generation announcement was the Semiconductor Research
Corporation（SRC）．This was createdin1982　as a permanent non－
PrOfit－making institution linked to the highlY influential
Semiconductor Zndustry Association．　　SRC is supported bY
industrial corporations who pay a subscriptionin proportion to
their turnover and′in returnr gain access to a broad spectrum
Of semiconductor research pro］eCtSr COnducted at US universities
under SRC sponsorship．　（BY COntraSt With Japan which is
frequently characterised as having a relatively weak universitY
SeCtOr，USindustrY has a s01id historY Of using of universities
to support research activities．）
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The ma］Or nOn－gOVernmental c011aborative response to Japan’s
Plans for fifth generation computing was the setting－uP Of
Ⅱicroelectronic and Computer Techn010gY Corporation（ⅡCC）・This
is anindependent researchinstitute funded by a consortium of
US companies・It．was set－upin1982to undertake pre－COmPetitive
researchin semiconductor and computer technologY On a Permanent
basis・　For the UST MCC was nothing short of rev01utionarY・　＝t
inv01ved unprecedented cooperation in a fiercely competitive
industry and was onlY made possible bY Changesin the anti－truSt
legislation．　A central research facilitY WaS COnStruCted at
Austinin Texas and work beganin1984．From the outset，HCC was
Seen aS a boldinitiative that would onlY PrOduce resultsin the
long－term．　During the late－1980S′　MCC embarked on a era of
restructuring‘Which led to an increased emphasis on interim
deliverables while，at the same time′PurSuinglonger－termgOals．
＝n this respect，HCC，s continued survival reflects a degree of
flexibilitY Whichis waY beyond what proved to be possible at
工COtP．
MCC was at the forefront of a new approach to c011aborative
researchin the US．During the1980S．several Bills were passed
by Congress which were designed to aid certain collaborative R＆D
activities that could be reg・arded as crucial to the national
interest・　＝n particularr these Bills served to clarifY the
POSition of co11aborative R＆D with regard to existing anti－truSt
legislation・This paved the way for a wide varietY Of research
COnSOrtia and′　bY the late－1980S，　C011aboration had been
established as alegitimate vehicle for sharing the costs and
uncertainties of pre－COmPetitive R＆D（See：Evan and Olk′1990）．
While MCC paved the waY for c011aborationin the US，thelaunch
Of the Sematech Consortiumin1987　represented a sea chang・ein
theUS administration，s prevailingattitude to c01laborativeR＆D・
Sematech was founded with thelarg・ely commercial objective of
enabling the US to compete more successfully withJapanin the
manufacture of semiconductor devices・Itis a non－PrOfit making
Organisation funded bY a tOtal of＄500million over5years from
－56－
the US Department of Defence′　Via DARPA，and a similar sum made
up from subscriptions paid bY　14　1eading semiconductor
manufacturers．
Competitivenessin chip manufacturing processes had been driven
bY the quest forincreased densitYin the production of memorY
Chips・　The problem for the US was that，bY the mid－19805，
1eadershipin this techn010gy was tending to shift toJapanese
firms・Horeover，US firms were also being displaced from the key
COmPOnent teChn010gY Of dYnamic random access memorY（D－RAM）
Chips byJapanese competition．　Fears that US firms would fall
behind in semiconductor production techn010g・y Without an
indigenous D－RAM capabilitY Were COuntered bY the idea that
SEⅡATECH would act as a Htechn01ogy driver．10r Hforcing groundH
for promoting state－Of－the－art PrOCeSSeS，although the extent to
（LSI Logic．which was founder member of Sematech，Withdrewin
January1992　arguing‘that the subscription could be used better
internally・）
A furtherinnbvationin federal support for R＆D has f0110Wed from
the1988　0mnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act・　One of the
COnSequenCeS Of this act is the creation of what some
COmmentatOrS have referred to as a LCivilian DARPA，in the forn
Of the NationalInstitute of Standards and Technology′s Advanced
Techn01ogY Programme（ATP）・This small butinnovative schemewas
launchedin1990as a mechanism for providing federal support to
US business carrYing Out Pre－COmPetitive R＆D in generic
techn01ogies（defined as concepts，COmPOnentS′　PrOCeSSeS Or
SCientific knowledge that could be applied to a broad range of
PrOducts and processes）．　The emphasis is on supporting‘
technologieS SuCh as　＝T that will play a significant rolein
enhancing US competitiveness．
During the period sinceJapan，s Fifth Generation
US p01icies thatimpinge on ZT have been changing・
has become established as alegitimate mechanism
Pre－COmPetitive R＆D both for privateindustryand′
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announcement，
Collaboratio
for conducting
more recently′
for federally－funded research．　Anindustrial policYis siowIY
beginning to emerge as part and parcel of the evolution of
POlicies for national securityJ On the one hand′　and a
COmPetitive trading position，On the other．　Defence research
funding is now being used to support advances in civilian
technologieSin the expectation thatit would preserve a national
CaPability that could be exploitedin future military prograrrLmeS
Whichl aS HowerY and Rosenberg have argued′is a reversal of
earlier patterns of funding and technological spillover（MowerY
and Rosenberg：1989）・　However，thereis a sensein which the
national focus of these p01icies has been overtaken bY the
globalisation of the computerindustry．　F0110wing the signing
Of theJapan－US Semiconductor Trade Agreementin September1991．
there has been a steadYincrease in the Hnatural alliances”
betweenJapanese and American firms and many would argue that
international rather than nationai ventures will become more
relevant as the1990s unf0ld．
Whileitis difficult to equateinitial post－fifth－generation
developmentsin the US to the UK′s AIvey Programme and similar
European government－SPOnSOred responses to the　’’Japanese
Chailenge”，the rise of private－SeCtOr－initiated collaboration
during the1980s reflected a growing belief that Hnew tacticsH
Were required to compete withJapan．Moreover，the principle of
Sharing research costs and uncertainties gradually permeated
Official policY makingrleading to the rise of ventures such as
Sematechwhich are US becoming established aslegitimateindustrY
SuPpOrt meChanisms for Hkeeping uPH withleading・Japanese firms・
The principle of federal support for c011aborative researchin
PurSuit of competitivenessis alsoillustrated bY the National
Bureau of Standard′s advanced TechnologY Programme・　Although
this only exists on a modest scale′itis neverthelessindicative
Of a new approach to p01icY formation・
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6　　Concluding CoH皿entS
近arkets are verY COmPlex structures．　Moreover，the nature and
dimensions of complexitY VarY COnSiderablY between different
national environments・Whileit could be argued that．fnational
innovation sYStemS”perform broadly similar basic functionsin
the sense that they translate technoiogiCal knowledge into
COmmerCial products and production processes，　there are
COnSiderable differencesin thewaYinWhich differentinnovation
SYStemS Perform these functions．　＝n particular，Substantial
Variations exist in the relationship between private firms，
governments and bodies contributing‘tO aSPeCtS Of”public domain
knowledge’一　that are relevant to techn010gical development（eg
universities and similarinstitutions）・
The development of an effective IT capabilitY by Japan，S
”national innovation sYStemH was conditioned bY a number of
Circumstances that were particular to Japan．　Policies were
initiallY directed towards creating economic HspaceH for the
basis of a computerindustry to be establishedin the face of an
OVerbearing competitive treat posed by ZBM．The use of US－Style
militarY PrOCurement tO aSSistin this objective was precluded
bY a POSt Second World War ban on defence－related exports．Since
direct foreigninvestment ran againstJapan，s tradition of self
Sufficiency．the relative status of c011aboration was higher on
the agenda of p01icY OPtions than might otherwise have been the
CaSe・　Even then′　C011aboration was only one of four basic
POlicies・　Ⅱoreover，the building of a Hc011aborative culture”
did not occurin aninstant but rather as the consequence of a
gradual learning‘PrOCeSS．Which t00k place over a series of
PrOjects・Strong competition between the firms was accompanied
by a sometimes less than harmonious relationship between the
industrial sector as a whoie and the g・OVernment・　Attempts by
MZT＝in the early－1970s to restructure theindustrYinto a few
．lnational champiOnS”were stronglY reSisted bY the firms andin
the end did not take place・Thus′a drift towards monop01Y Which
is generally restrained bYleg・islationin the West（eg through
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US Anti－Trust Laws etc）was constrained by the l’naturalr’
COmPetitiveinstincts ofJapanese firms．
Given the extent of competition betweenJapan，sIT firms′itis
Perhaps appropriate to ask whyinitiatives such as the VLSI
PrOject were apparentlY SO SuCCeSSful．　＝n prospect，the firms
Were reluctant to particiPatein a venture that could compromise
theirindependence．　Yet the degree of government funding was
high enoug‘h to mean that non－ParticIPation would place firms at
a commercial disadvantage relative to particIPating firms・This
COrnmerCial incentive was accentuated bY the project’S．lnear
market一．orientation・Although there was a central facilitywhich
PrOVided for an environment for shared knowledge creation，this
WaS mainlY COnCerned with more basic research．　The bulk of the
PrOject，s commerciallY－Oriented development work was organised
On a mOre．．mOdular”basis，enabling firms tointernalise the
benefits of government－SPOnSOred research without compromising
their competitive positions．　Commerciaiisation of project
OutPutS WaS helped by effectiveinternal communication channels
that exist between different sections within Japanese firms・
Against the background ofJapan，s stableindustrial structure，
the project could be thought of as an example of the government
PrOViding a ffbalanced subsidy．f to rival firms，rather than
Creating a mechanism for sharing the risks and uncertainties of
research・These uncertainties werein any case alreadYlimited
by the fact that thel．window of commercial opportunitY．l for the
technoiogy had already been opened byleading US firms and the
direction of techn010giCal development was well signPOSted・
OnceJapan started to catch－uP With the West，the position began
to chang・e・　The clear target disappeared andit became more
difficult to see howH＝T＝couldimpose strategic direction on an
industrY that was subject to such a rapid pace of techn010giCal
developmentt combined with turbulent changesin the structure of
its associated markets・One dimension of MITI・s response was a
move towards c011aborative basic research projects．　The Fifth
Generation Computer SYStemS Project was a ma］Or departure from
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the preceding・aPpiications－Oriented ERAs・Zn some respectsTit
COuid be seen as an attempt to build a basic research component
into aninnovation system which did not have a strong tradition
Oflinks with university research．　＝ts achievements have not
been closely correlated to the evolving ag・enda of particIPating
firms，commercial requirements and the translation of outputs
into competitive advantageislikelY tO be anindirect process・
Many aspects of the project，s work have entered the public domain
and have a status whichis not altogether unlike that of academic
WOrk conductedin Western universities．The Real World Computing
PrograrrLmeis a further extension of the use of c011aboration to
PrOmOteinter－firm′　一Iclose to the pubiic domain．．basic research・
＝n this respect，COllaboration is being used to foster the
development of a new research network．
Given the very particular nature of the circumstances under which
C011aborative research promoted the competitiveness ofJapanese
ZT firmsr it is perhaps hardlY SurPrising that the West，s
attempts to use the concept as a means for matching the dynamism
Of theJapanese economY have not been without their problems・
The expectation that the Alvey Programme could use pre－
COmPetitive c01laborative research to match Japanese－Style
COmPetitiveness asked more from c011aborative research than had
been achievedinJapan・　＝t was the application－Oriented E：ms
Organised onmodular basis that were most closelYaSSOCiated with
PrOmOting industrial competitiveness．　The Fifth Generation
Pro］eCt’s use of shared knowledge creation was a radical
departure from previous practice．
While problems with exploitation arelikelY tO remain a problem
for pre－COmPetitive collaborative research programmes in any
national environmentrit does not necessarily f0110w that such
initiatives are without value．　New networks of the sort being
Pioneered in Japan′s Real World Computing Programme were
established with some considerable success under AIveY・　These
networking benefits are also a feature of pan－European
initiatives and have also been exhibited bY C011aborative schemes
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in the US・Such networks are of specialimportancein national
environments where thereis scope to extend the role of public
SeCtOr reSearChin the nationalinnovation system・　Countries′
like Britain and the US′　Which have a strong academic research
in ZT－related sectors have used cooperative research to
COnS01idate their national knowledg・e bases・　During the1980sT
Anti－Trust restrictions（Which were eliminated from theJapanese
environmentin1957）were relaxedin the US，therebYarticuiating
a fundamentallynewattitude to competition．Federa11Y SuPPOrted
initiatives such as Sematech are also being commended to the
Clinton Administration as policY aS mOdels forimproving the
nationalinnovation systems．Trans－nationallinks across Europe
have also helped to unite disparate resources・Howeverl the
COnStruCtion of these new communicationinfrastructures does not
SOIve the problem of how best to proceed into the unknown
territorY Of research－driveninnovation．While theY Can PrOVide
an effective to01for supporting national and international
knowledge creation．　claims that they will automatically
Strengthen competitive performance should be treated with
Caution．
During the period whenJapan′s computerindustry was catching－uP
With best practice Western techn01ogieS′　the g‘0Vernment，s
P01icies were often effective in minimising the effects of
COmPetitivedisadvantages whichconfrontedJapanese firms．Since
the early－1980sr theJapanese government has faced the problem
Of producing poiicies that foster national competitive
advantages・Governmentsin such a position are not usua11Y Well
Placed to Hpick winnersl・andJapan・s approach to supporting the
ITindustrY nOW features a substantial element of basic research：
therebYreflectingalong－eStablishedthemeof p01icies practised
in the West・Understanding future patterns ofinnovation will
require a deep appreciation of how　工T firms，organisationai
knowledgecreationprocessesinteractwithevolvingtechnologiCal
and market sYStemS at national andinternationallevels．
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